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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
The Department of Defense has utilized commercial carriers for moving military 
forces from the War of Independence to the present.  World War I saw the government 
briefly flirt with constructing vessels to provide sufficient shipping capabilities for 
moving war material to support U.S. troops.  However, having to ignite the furnaces of 
heavy industry and develop capabilities took time and ultimately, the “United States rode 
to victory in British vessels.”1   
Since 1789, policies and legislation have influenced the U. S. Merchant fleet and 
its role in moving material for the Department of Defense in both war and peace.  
International events in communications and trade of the past two decades have resulted in 
a shrinking globe.  International commerce still relies heavily on transportation by sea.  
Differing national laws and wage scales now decide where ships are built, bought, 
manned and registered.  This thesis will look at the historical factors resulting in the 
current environment in which U.S. Merchant fleets are competing, and the evolution of 
the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA).   
B. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to provide a chronology of the VISA 
program.  To do so, it is necessary to provide a historical overview of the United States 
maritime industry.  The thesis will focus primarily on those policies and legislative acts 
that resulted in the need to establish a working agreement between industry and the U.S. 
government to provide for moving Department of Defense material in both war and 
peace.  The following secondary questions support the primary research question: 
· What is the origin and current organization of the Voluntary Intermodal 
Sealift Agreement? 
· Are the changes in VISA’s organization addressing the original intent of 
the agreement and does it currently meet that intent? 
· How has technology been incorporated to VISA’s operations? 
· How will VISA contribute to moving military material in the future? 
                                                 
1 De La Pedraja, R., “Rise and Decline of US Merchant Fleet in the Twentieth Century”, New York, 
Twayne, p. 58. 
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C. SCOPE LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
In order to more narrowly focus the history of the United States maritime 
industry, this paper will look only at the legislative acts that had a direct and immediate 
impact.  To provide a sense of orderliness, this will be conducted in chronological phases 
for the periods from America’s independence to World War I; World War I to World 
War II; World War II to Operation Desert Shield; and Operation Desert Storm through 
the present day.  This paper will not attempt to describe the entire history of the U.S. 
maritime industry, but will focus on laws and policies through each phase of the maritime 
history.   
The various programs and agreements between government and industry will also 
be presented in chronological order.  Their influence on the VISA program differs from 
the influence they were intended to exert on the whole of merchant marine shipping.  
Discussion of VISA’s current organization and whether or not it meets its intentions will 
be derived from policies, legislation and comparisons to other transportation programs.   
D. METHODOLOGY 
Research was at the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) 
Research Center archives.  Various documents were reviewed and selected for inclusion 
in this paper. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II, “A Brief History Of Maritime Programs,” will review maritime 
policies since 1789 and their cascading effect on today’s U.S. merchant fleet.  By 
defining each of theses programs and acts, their impact on the evolution of the VISA 
program can be more clearly understood. 
Chapter III, “The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement,” will begin by 
identifying the agencies involved in creating VISA.  In the 21st century, the U. S. 
government no longer makes policy decisions in a vacuum.  With the Cold War over, the 
U.S. military had to realign itself with the new world order, and the threats it poses.  It 
took a combined effort by members in DOD, government and industry to develop a 
feasible solution that could respond to this new global environment. 
3 
Chapter IV, “Analysis, Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Study,” 
will look at the mechanics of activating VISA and how it interacts with other existing 
MARAD programs.  VISA will also be compared to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) 






































II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MARITIME LEGISLATION AND 
POLICY 
The United States had been a seagoing nation since birth.  Founded and settled by 
colonists from the Old World, the New World survived and flourished through sea trade.  
America ultimately fought and won her independence on the very sea that sustained her.  
The government has therefore intervened in the maritime industry from the beginning, 
resulting in a long and complex history.  The following events highlight the legal, fiscal 
and national security concerns about maritime trade and lead to the legislation and 
policies that influenced the creation of VISA. 
A. PRIOR TO WWI 
Only thirteen years after gaining independence, the first Continental Congress 
convened and passed one of the first Acts to affect maritime trade.  Desperate for funding 
to support the new nation, they passed the Tariff Act of 1789.  This act generated funds 
by assessing a fee on both imports and exports.  By reducing the tariff against goods 
shipped on U.S. flagged and U.S. owned vessels, it stimulated growth in America’s 
merchant fleet.  This act was not a direct subsidy, but offered incentives to foreign 
owners of U.S. flagged ships and to owners of ships built in America.  The resulting 
increased business in the shipping trade brought the desired increase in revenue to the 
young government.   
Many bills were presented before Congress over the ensuing years, but the next 
significant Act was the Cabotage Act of 1817.  The purpose of the Cabotage Act was to 
preserve shipping routes between ports in the U.S.  This protection ensured carriers had 
guaranteed business along these routes, and subsequently a minimum number of ships 
would be preserved.  This act, Public Law 33, is still in effect today.   
The 29th Congress then passed an act in 1845 similar to today’s incentive 
programs.  This act authorized the Postmaster General to grant mail-carrying contracts to 
liners carrying U.S. mail on steamships that could be converted to warships if the need 
arose. The Mail Steamship Bill of 1845 also called for regular steamship routes between 
U.S. ports.  It later expanded to overseas ports and encouraged the expansion of U.S. 
trade.  One of the most prestigious Acts, and eventually the most profitable, called for a 
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regular steamship line to be established between New York and the Pacific coast, 
covering Oregon and later California.  Mail contracts under the Mail Steamship Bill were 
also used to establish American steamship lines to Cuba, Panama, Liverpool and other 
major European ports.  The first act to openly provide funds to sustain the U. S. merchant 
fleet was the Subsidy Act of 1891, which expanded the mail contracts to high-speed 
ships.  The underlying purpose was to expand trade and support a growing national 
defense strategy as America departed from her interna l expansion and isolationist 
policies.  This act created many new trade routes before expiring in 1923. 
The Military Transportation Act of 1904 was the first of three major landmarks in 
maritime legislation that dealt with cargo preference for U.S. flagged ships.2  Unlike the 
Cabotage Act, which was primarily concerned with cargo transported between U.S. ports, 
or the Mail Act, which was a diplomatic means to expand U.S. trade, this Act specified 
that Army and Navy supplies must be born on U.S. flagged vessels, when transporting 
goods to overseas military bases.  The precedent was now set for the military using 
private shipping through government covenants. 
B. WWI TO WWII 
In 1914, the outbreak of World War I in Europe witnessed the withdrawal of 
foreign ships for exporting cargo from U.S. ports.  The inventory of ships in the U. S. 
merchant fleet had fallen drastically, with only 116 vessels as of June 30th, 1914.3  As 
Great Britain requisitioned her merchant ships to meet the demands of World War I, 
American cotton rotted on the docks, despite a 1,000 percent increase in shipping rates.  
To ease the crisis, Congress enacted emergency legislation in 1914 to permit foreign-flag 
ships to be registered under the U.S. flag for operation in foreign trade.4  
The Shipping Act of 1916 was a significant landmark in Maritime industry.  It 
created the Shipping Board of five commissioners to oversee the industry, and attempted 
to revive the U.S. shipping industry by legislating the acquisition of new ships and 
specifying that ships could not be “bought or chartered from any nation at war.”5  
                                                 
2 Heine, I.M., U.S. Maritime Industry in the National Interest, p. 4. 
3 http://www.usmm.org/ships1914.html. 
4 http://www.navyleague.org/seapower/us_flag_merchant_marine_a_century_in_review.htm. 
5 Ibid, p. 6. 
7 
Collaboration between shipping lines was authorized, but not for the purposes of fixing 
shipping rates.  The Act also included guidance on selling or disposing of ships to U.S. 
citizens.  The 1916 explosion in shipbuilding, intended to support the war effort, resulted 
in 1429 keels being laid down, but only 470 ships being delivered by the war’s end.6   
After the war, the resulting over-capacity had to be dealt with.  After the troops 
returned home and maritime commerce returned to normal, America sought to dispose of 
its government owned fleet.  Though provisions for selling ships to U.S. citizens were 
provided for under the 1916 Act, eliminating the glut of post-war government owned 
ships was a slow process.  Congress stepped in again and passed the Merchant Marine 
Act of 1920.  In addition to providing for sales of the fleet, it also recognized the need to 
preserve some part of it for a merchant fleet: 
That it is necessary for the national defense and the proper growth of the 
foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a 
merchant marine of the best equipped and most suitable types of vessels 
sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval 
or military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, ultimately to be 
owned and operated privately by citizens of the United States.7 
Also known as the Jones Act, this law is most often cited for its efforts to preserve 
a militarily useful fleet, rather than for disposing of WWI vessels.  The Act also enhanced 
Cabotage laws and protected American seamen’s jobs.   
Even with the passage of the two previous acts, sales of surplus ships were 
sluggish.  Congress again tried to create an economic balance while sustaining a 
merchant fleet through the Merchant Marine Act of 1928.  This act was intended to 
stimulate private industry by expanding construction loans, requiring government 
officials to travel on U.S. ships and directing that mail contracts be granted based on a 
bidding basis, with the lowest bid being selected.   
Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected in 1932, in the middle of the Great Depression.  
One year later found a juxtaposition between domestic and international shipping within 
the U.S. merchant fleet. While nearly 57% of the ships intended for international trade 
                                                 
6 De La Prejada, Rene, “Rise and Decline of U.S. Merchant Shipping in the Twentieth Century”, 
Twayne Publishers, p. 6. 
7 Merchant Marine Act of 1920. 
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were laid up due to lack of work, domestic shipping was bustling due to Cabotage 
practices and cheap surplus ships.  The highly competitive market among coastwise 
shippers resulted in unstructured rates and cost cutting practices.  However, the U.S. 
ships were no match for the more modern ships operated less expensively by foreign 
fleets.  Before the advent of the New Deal, the mail contracts were seen as exorbitant 
government spending on a select few.  The Special Committee To Investigate Air Mail 
and Ocean Mail Contracts began on February 25, 1933 and culminated on June 18 of that 
year.  The Committee emphasized the inefficiency and waste occurring under the guise of 
the mail contracts.  After reviewing the results of this and other investigations conducted 
on the shipping trade, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked for some significant changes 
in a 1936 address to Congress.  He wanted a U.S. merchant fleet that could compete with 
foreign shipping firms without disguised subsidies, be strong enough to continue foreign 
trade in event of a war, and provide ships to the Navy in wartime.   
The 72nd Congress drafted the 1936 Merchant Marine Act to accomplish these 
objectives.  In addition, the Act created the Maritime Commission to manage the 
merchant fleet, provided direct subsidies to offset the construction and manning cost 
differences between the U.S. and foreign shippers, authorized the government to build 
ships for foreign trade routes, provided loans, ship mortgage and war risk insurance, and 
authorized a training program for merchant seamen.  Unaware that World War II was 
looming on the horizon, the commission set out to modernize shipyards and to begin 
building ships that could be competitive with their European counterparts at the rate of 50 
ships per year.  Between 1939 and 1946, 4,976 commercial ships were built.  This effort 
was critical to support the war effort in both Europe and the Pacific, and moved over 7 
million passengers and 260 million tons of dry and liquid cargo between 1941 and 1945. 
C. THE COLD WAR TO THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 
Prior to the end of World War II, government planners recognized a situation 
similar to that prevailing at the end of World War I, and prepared for the orderly draw 
down of the government owned fleet.  The Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 preserved a 
National Defense Reserve Fleet, and provided for selling surplus ships at fixed prices to 
both U.S. and non-U.S. citizens.  Not only did this refine America’s policies regarding 
national and international shipping, but also provided replacement ships to allied nations 
9 
that lost part of their merchant fleet during the war.  Rebuilding Europe in the years after 
the war resulted in economic growth for the U.S. and remained strong for several years.   
However, following the end of the Korean conflict, low priced foreign 
competition once again forced the U.S. fleet from the market.  An estimated 43% of 
privately owned American flagged ships were left un-utilized by the middle of 1954.  
Congress turned their focus back onto to the merchant fleet and passed two cargo 
preference acts.  The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act is generally 
concerned with the overseas shipment of agricultural products.  This Act, also known as 
Public Law 480 or “Food for Peace” had four goals: 1) to develop new markets, 2) 
dispose of surplus agriculture products, 3) encourage development in less developed 
countries and 4) provide emergency supplies to aid in disaster relief. 8  Government 
purchases and shipping of these commodities not only raised the domestic prices of these 
goods, but also ensured business for the U.S. Merchant fleet.  But Title III (a) of this Act 
(Public Law 480) allows for bartering surplus commodities for U.S. stockpiling of 
strategic goods.  This was intended to create a foothold in (European) foreign nations 
during the Cold War. 
The Cargo Preference Act of 1954 (Public Law 664) governs Cabotage in relation 
to government-generated cargo.  The huge postwar aid programs for Europe’s recovery 
specified that U.S. ships be allocated “at least 50 percent” of the new cargoes generated 
by the government-sponsored programs. Those cargoes kept the American fleet busy in 
the immediate postwar period, but tended to blind the industry to the need to modernize 
to compete with the newer and much more efficient foreign-flag fleets.9 
In 1967, the Department of Defense recognized a need for sealift augmentation 
for contingencies that amounted to less than full-scale war.  Private industry, represented 
by the Committee of American Steamship Lines, proposed a program, including pre-
negotiated activation procedures, that would provide commercially owned and operated 
sealift resources to the Department of Defense.  This program was originally titled the 
Commercial Sealift Augmentation Program (CSAP).  Beginning with its July 1969 




contract solicitation for ocean services, the Military Sealift Command required that ocean 
carriers had to commit ships to the CSAP to be eligible for a contact award.  At the time, 
the requirement did not specify a particular number or percentage of ships.  That 
requirement was established in 1971, when a criterion for eligibility in the program was 
set at committing 50 percent of fleet assets.  The program was renamed the Sealift 
Readiness Program (SRP) at the same time.  Seven years later, the Maritime 
Appropriations Act directed 
that all vessels receiving either a federal construction or operating subsidy 
must be enrolled in the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP), whether or not 
they received Department of Defense peacetime business.  Any call-up of 
ships under the SRP would be initiated by both the Commander, Military 
Sealift Command, who would determine if additional sealift would be 
required, and the Maritime Administration, which would assess the impact 
of the call-up on commercial trade.10   
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 changed the Department of Defense forever.  
Requiring better business practices in the Department of Defense, this Act created the 
United States Transportation Command, USTRASNSCOM in October of 1987.  This 
new, unified CINC was given the authority to bring the different component 
transportation capabilities under one command and to provide a single point of 
coordination for the war fighting CINCs. 
D. THE PERSIAN GULF WAR  
The SRP was in place and had 132 ships enrolled during Operation Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm, but was never exercised.  Though intended for just such an event 
(less than full scale mobilization), activation of SRP was contingent upon the 
unavailability of shipping.  Unavailable was defined as: 1) at either fair and reasonable 
prices, or 2) in insufficient quantities and the Ready Reserve Fleet could not be deployed 
in sufficient quantity or time to meet sealift requirements.  Prior to activation, MARAD 
would be required to draft an economic impact statement on private industry.  Due to the 
availability of charter ships, many of them foreign flagged, an ad hoc agreement was 
quickly drafted to secure sufficient shipping for the Gulf war.  The Special Middle East 
Shipping Agreement, SMSEA, gave MSC access to considerably more Roll-On/Roll-Off 
and break bulk ships than did the SRP. SMSEA was used to move over 37,000 forty-foot 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 
containers of material to the gulf in support of Desert Shield and Desert Storm.  As 
expected, this hastily patched together agreement disrupted private industry and resulted 
in higher costs to the government than might have otherwise been negotiated. 
Upon the successful conclusion of Desert Storm, military planners from 
USTRANSCOM were tasked with revising the SRP.  With the new role of the U.S. 
military driven home by the events of Aug 90 - Dec 90, it was evident that the Cold war 
model was outdated and the global environment was shifting toward smaller-scale 
conflicts in remote locations not previously considered by defense planners.  The new 
role would be one of rapid deployment from U.S. shores, as opposed to forward deployed 

























































III. A HISTORY OF VISA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A 1978 command post exercise named Nifty Nugget brought to light the limited 
understanding and cooperation between DOD and private industry regarding 
“mobilization.”  Despite the continuing Cold War, inter-service rivalry left little room for 
cooperation within DOD, let alone with industry.  Attitudes were forced to change when 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act was passed eight years later.  This 1986 Act compelled the 
different military service branches to pare down redundant operations.  President Reagan 
established USTRANSCOM on 18 April 1987, which created a new, unified command.  
This effort required repealing Public Law 77-252 that specifically prohibited 
consolidating functions of military transportation commands.11 
1. United States Transportation Command 
USTRANSCOM was created while the Cold War was winding down, and began 
operations in a changing global environment.  Without a stable opponent, DOD was 
tasked with defining its role and justifying its purpose in a new environment that seemed 
to have significantly reduced threats to U.S. security.  USTRANSCOM had to develop its 
mission to support the CINCs.  Although a unified command with a four star CINC at its 
head, USTRANSCOM oversaw the transportation capabilities of the various components, 
but still did not have the power it needed to do the task it was created to accomplish.  
Each of the Service branches--Air Force, Army and Navy--retained their charter for their 
respective modes of transportation, air, land and sea.  USTRANSCOM’s authority was 
limited to wartime, and, as a result, numerous interagency battles occurred over the 
transportation issues. 
a. Air Mobility Command (AMC) 
The Air Mobility Command is responsible for common-user air 
transportation for the Department of Defense.  AMC has utilized the Civil Reserve Air 
Fleet (CRAF) since 1950 to provide surge capacity during force deployments.  This 
program is an agreement with commercial carriers to provide certain aircraft, designated 
by tail number, to move personnel and equipment.  An agreement, not a contract, this 
                                                 
11 Matthews, J. K., and Holt, C. J., “So Many, So Much, So far, So Fast,” USTRANSCOM, 1996.  
14 
program offers carriers preference for DOD business in peacetime as an incentive for 
participating.  AMC oversees the program to ensure DOD business is offered based on 
CRAF commitment. This program heavily influenced the initial phases of development 
of the VISA program. 
b. Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) 
The Military Transportation Management Command is responsible for 
overland transportation and common user seaport operations.  Their responsibility to 
oversee port operations is directly affected by VISA’s ability to contract for all phases of 
material movement, due to the intermodal capabilities enjoyed by commercial lines.  
Because some military equipment has specialized transport requirements, MTMC will 
not be undone by VISA, but will have a reduced role in moving “like-material” that 
shipping lines already handle.  Hazardous materials and ammunition are some of the 
materials that still require MTMC specific transportation capabilities. 
c. Military Sealift Command (MSC) 
The Military Sealift Command is responsible for the organic capability to 
move DOD material by sealift.  According to the MSC web site, the “Military Sealift 
Command is to provide ocean transportation of equipment, fuel, supplies and ammunition 
to sustain U.S. forces worldwide during peacetime and in war for as long as operational 
requirements dictate. During a war, more than 95 percent of all the equipment and 
supplies needed to sustain the U.S. military are carried by sea.”12  The claim that 95% of 
all material is carried by sea may be statistically accurate, but only a limited amount is 
provided by organic capabilities, with the bulk of material being moved by commercial 
means.  Under VISA, MSC would no longer be the single point of contact for identifying 
commercial ships (though MSC would remain in charge of non-VISA ships and any 
foreign flag charters, and act as contracting officer for ships chartered for Department of 
Defense under the VISA program).  
2. The Marine Administration (MARAD)   
Established subsequent to the Merchant Marine act of 1936, the Maritime 
Administration was created under the Department of Commerce and was transferred to 
                                                 
12 http://www.msc.navy.mil/N00p/mission.htm. 
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the Department of Transportation in 1982.  A government agency, but not a defense 
agency, MARAD’s mission is: 
to promote the development and maintenance of an adequate, well-
balanced United States merchant marine, sufficient to carry the Nation's 
domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial portion of its waterborne 
foreign commerce, and capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary 
in time of war or national emergency. 
MARAD also seeks to ensure that the United States enjoys adequate 
shipbuilding and repair services, efficient ports, effective intermodal water 
and land transportation systems, and reserve shipping capacity in time of 
national emergency. 13 
Responsible for about $475 million annually in subsidies to the U.S. merchant 
fleet, MARAD has a keen interest in any changes to DOD’s sealift requirements 
concerning mobilization.  These subsidies are to sustain and encourage a privately owned 
U.S. flagged and crewed merchant fleet14 and shipbuilding capabilities.  The shrinking 
global market place offers savings opportunities that could put MARAD and DOD at 
odds over the costs of moving military material. 
3. Carriers  
The number and names of the commercial carriers fluctuate each year because 
VISA is a voluntary program.  The initial enrollment of 22 carriers has stayed relatively 
consistent, averaging 23 commercial lines between 1997 and 1999.  No records were 
available for the number of carriers represented in the VISA working group meetings.  
B. A HISTORY OF VISA 
The concept for VISA came from a draft prepared in 1991 by MARAD, which 
first used the VISA title. Almost simultaneously, the VISA draft made its way through 
USTRANSCOM, and the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) published a report citing 
DOD’s need to revise its sealift capabilities.  The LMI report stated “ that the method the 
Military Sealift Command used to procure commercial sealift services (direct competitive 
bidding) precluded effective military/industry contingency planning, a key ingredient for 
a sound sealift augmentation program.”15  Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of 
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16 
Defense, the report was then passed down to USTRANSCOM.  MSC rebutted the LMI 
report, claiming that it contained “numerous inaccuracies, conflicting statements, and 
unsubstantiated conclusions, and should not be used as the sole basis for changes to 
Department of Defense (DOD) transportation policy.”16   
The conflict of interest between MSC, MARAD and USTRANSCOM was 
evident. An oral history from the USTRANSCOM Research Center Archives explained 
USTRANSCOM’s involvement in the resolution of the conflict between DOD 
representatives and industry:  
we didn’t get into VISA because we had this great vision of VISA.  We 
got into VISA because of the trouble our component (MSC) and our 
suppliers were having in communicating with each other.  So the VISA 
initiative was as much to open a dialogue and smooth the waters as it was 
to try and establish a [CRAF] like program for sealift.17   
Subsequently, USTRANCOM was formally tasked by the Joint Staff and the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Navy to review the SRP and sealift 
procurement process.   
In 1993, USTRANSCOM hosted a conference of Chief Executive Officers from 
the maritime industry.  In order to get carrier participation in the process, MSC was not 
invited.  USTRANSCOM representatives presented the concept of a sealift readiness 
program comparable to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).  CRAF had been in place 
since 1952, and was successfully executed during the Gulf War.  Unlike the Sealift 
Programs, aircraft participating in CRAF were specifically committed to the program, 
and policies for activation had been refined over 40 years of negotiations between 
military air transporters and industry.  CRAF was cited as a successful marriage between 
DOD transportation needs and private industry capabilities that could be used in various 
stages of declared emergencies, from low intensity conflicts through war.  During Desert 
Storm/Desert Shield, CRAF carriers transported over 70,000 personnel and 35,000 short 
tons of cargo between August of 1990 and February of 1991.  Later that year, 
USTRANSCOM directed the MSC commander to initiate a study to improve the SRP, 
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but was privately leaning toward a program that was organized along the CRAF 
framework.  
The beginning of 1994 saw a number of meetings and exchanges within 
USTRANSCOM, and between the CINCs and MARAD. Heading up the overall process 
to improve sealift, USTRANSCOM received ongoing reports form various working 
groups to evaluate sealift readiness: the Sealift Readiness Improvement Study conducted 
by MSC, and three internal working groups; a Requirements Planning Group, a 
Readiness Group, and a Transportation Acquisition Process Group.  MSC attempted to 
maintain their independence from the VISA position, proposing a “new” program 
tentatively titled “Joint Planning Agreement” (JPA).  As an alternative to VISA, JPA 
would focus on joint planning, mimicking the policies MSC used to provide peacetime 
sealift.  MSC offered to refine current SRP procurement policies and procedures to 
combine with the JPA, creating a comprehensive sealift readiness program.  But 
USTRANSCOM was convinced that the VISA proposal could “support most Department 
of Defense mobilization objectives; and once a mutually agreeable joint planning 
arrangement had solidified, the readiness aspects of VISA should be worked out”. 18  
MSC made one last attempt to preserve their position by recommending portions of 
VISA be incorporated into the JPA and that the result should be ancillary to SRP. 
In August of 1994, the head of the Department of Justice, Attorney General Janet 
Reno, formally approved the draft text of the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, 
and MARAD published it in the Federal Register.  But at USTRANSCOM, the members 
of the Executive Working Group were at odds, and 
senior leadership at all levels of the United States Transportation 
Command, the Maritime Administration, NDTA, and industry had to get 
personally involved in order to overcome the problems blocking further 
development of a program to replace the Sealift Readiness Program. 19   
Issues regarding the rate methodology of a CRAF-like program were questioned.  
A team from Military Sealift Command (MSC), Price Waterhouse, and the Department of 
Transportation’s Volpe Center identified the different rate structures used by ocean 
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carriers and cited that they could not be condensed into a one-size-fits-all rate for a single 
carrier, let alone for a common rate to be used with all carriers.  Ocean carriers, operated 
uniquely in a common environment, and calculated costs differently on different routes.   
The year 1995 was spent refining the VISA program.  Concerns over the subsidies 
currently sustaining the diminishing U.S. flagged fleet were addressed.  It wasn’t until a 
year later, in 1996, that the Maritime Security Act was passed by Congress and signed 
into law by President Clinton.  One of the tenets of this act was the 100 million dollar 
Maritime Security Program (MSP), which came to sustain 47 ships in the U.S. merchant 
fleet.  Carriers that received MSP funds were required to join VISA, but foreign flag 
vessels could be substituted for subsidized vessels during contingencies.  Operating 
differential subsidies that also sustained the U.S. merchant fleet would be phased out in 
1996.  The anticipated changes on the structure of the U.S. merchant fleet raised 
apprehension among Navy leadership.  They were concerned that control over the U.S. 
flagged fleet was being reduced due to foreign purchases of U.S. vessels, and that the 
subsidies needed to sustain VISA would become a bill for the Department of the Navy or 
Department of Transportation to pay.   
Specific wording regarding VISA activation authority was drafted.  Like CRAF, 
three activation stages were developed to address increasing levels of contingencies to 
which the military might respond.  But unlike airlift, which is intense during the early 
stages of a conflict and then decreases, sealift support is a sustaining logistics resource 
that could cause long-term disruption to the maritime industry.  VISA activation authority 
was an issue not only for MARAD and DOD, but was raised to the office of the National 
Security Advisor. 
USTRANSCOM DCINC observed the beginnings of conflict resolution between 
the members responsible for making VISA a reality.  Army Lieutenant General Kenneth 
R. Wykle noted “that MSC staff wanted to obligate the contractor to provide assured 
access to the government, but that they also wanted “the government to be free to go on 
the open market at anytime to get the lowest tramp steamer or rogue ship that might be 
out there.”20  LTG Wykle underscored USTRANSCOM’s position that if the 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
19 
“government expected the carrier to sign up then the carriers must have assured access to 
government business.  However, if the carriers could not meet Department of Defense 
requirements, USTRANSCOM would then have the flexibility to go to the open 
market.”21  General Wykle also observed that Navy Vice Admiral Phillip M. Quast, 
Commander, MSC, “appeared increasingly flexible about changing the way MSC did 
business, but his civilian staff still seemed reluctant to change their past procedures.”22   
A war game was designed and played out to test VISA’s activation and execution.  
The results were generally positive and proved the value of the Joint Planning Advisory 
Group (JPAG) concept.  JPAG included members from MARAD, USTRANSCOM, 
labor, and program participant operators on a team to execute the various stages of VISA.  
Negotiations between MARAD and DOD after the war game, transferred activation 
authority for Stages I and II to USTRANSCOM, but kept Stage III authority with 
MARAD and the Department of Transportation.  USTRANSCOM, citing CRAF 
procedures as a template, wanted activation authority for all three stages.  Because Stage 
III is full-scale mobilization, it was supportable regardless of activation authority.    
In October, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs approved USTRANSCOM’s request 
to allow VISA to fulfill the carrier’s previous commitment to SRP.  This request covered 
a one-year implementation period that would also be used to run field tests in the Pacific 
to assess the two proposed rate structures.  One month later, twenty-two carriers signed 
up for the VISA prototype. 
During 1996, debates continued over carrier compensation.  Two methods were 
being reviewed, a Uniform Commercial Rate (UCR), based upon a single rate applicable 
in peace and war, and a Best Value Rate (BVR) model, which was based on competitive 
pricing.  The UCR was similar to the methodology used by CRAF and was preferred due 
to its simplicity.  But ocean transport was significantly different from air transport and 
BVR was developed as an alternative.  These two rates would be evaluated in side by 
side testing in the Pacific theater over a one-year period.   




Another war game was held in 1996, this time testing VISA’s capabilities to 
respond to two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.  VISA’s structure and procedures 
were viable for most of the material needed by deployed troops, but ammunition 
transportation was difficult due to special requirements for handling, storing, and 
shipping.  After the war game was finished, letters were exchanged between MARAD 
and USTRANSCOM to explain the approval/activation authority for Stage III. 
More debates raged over the contracting methods and rate negotiation during 
1996.  Ocean carrier rates were based upon a number of different factors.  With the 
decline in U.S. shipping of nearly 33 percent since 1988, and the rise in competition from 
foreign nations, U.S. carriers based their rates on the following concepts: 
· Type of cargo - whether material can be containerized 
· Type of container - 20’, 40’ or refrigerated 
· The routes - longer routes result in greater energy costs 
· The ports - material being shipped to different ports; customs, 
foreign port capabilities impact off- load, and also affects overland 
transportation in intermodal contracts. 
· Competition - highly desirable routes experience heavy 
competition between carriers, hence lower costs; less desirable 
routes incur higher costs 
· Rebates - customers that shipped large quantities are often eligible 
for rebates.   
Taking these into consideration, executing a contract with a VISA participant in 
peacetime, regardless of cargo preference laws, could result in the government paying a 
U.S. carrier more money to transport goods to a foreign port, than to contract for a 
foreign carrier to transport the same goods under an open contract. 
USTRANSCOM had to reinforce the position that VISA was an agreement 
between industry and the Department of Transportation.  As a program in which carriers 
enrolled voluntarily, unless they were receiving MSP subsidies, VISA would set a 
framework for pre-negotiated access to commercial sealift capabilities.  Because it was 
pre-arranged, DOD could be assured of fair and reasonable costs if executed.  By 
December of 1996, the final version of VISA was published by MARAD and 
USTRANSCOM. 
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The Secretary of Defense gave final approval for replacing SRP with VISA in 
January of 1997.  In February, MARAD announced VISA’s implementation in the 
Federal Register.  A Rate Methodology Working Group continued to discuss Stage III 
activation compensation.  Because Stage III required carriers to forfeit 100 percent of the 
carrying capacity of their subsidized ships under a full-scale mobilization, compensation 
had to be not less than the commercial rate for transportation of like goods, and needed to 
take into account possible loss of income by disrupting a carrier’s commercial business.  
Stage I and II were designed for less than full scale mobilization and would require 
roughly 15 to 40 percent of a carrier’s capacity, respectively.  Because the number of 
ships and capacity can change each year, based on enrollment in the program, MARAD is 
constrained to recalculate shipping capacity and percentage needed.  And as Stage I and 
II are considered Peacetime activation, the BVR and UCR had to be evaluated as to 
which would provide the best option for both government and industry. 
Ongoing tests of BVR and UCR rates were being conducted in the Pacific using 
American President Lines and Sea-Land for the trials.  In addition to evaluating the rate 
structure, four other areas of the carrier’s performance were to be assessed prior to 
making a report to the Secretary of Defense.  TRANSCOM was to review Service 
Improvement, Cost Assessment, Readiness, and Streamlined Acquisition. The final rate 
methodology recommendation included two possible rates: unit and per diem.  The unit 
rate applied to individual cargo shipments, while the per diem rate applied to vessel time 
charters.  There were three types of unit rates:  container, measurement ton, and square 
foot.  Rates were specific to both carrier and vessel string.  An independent firm, Law 
and Economic Consulting Group (LECG), concluded that the carriers’ reticence in 
releasing proprietary information, “severely impaired DOD’s ability to negotiate fair and 
reasonable rates.”23  The UCR was then redesigned to allow the carriers to choose one of 
three options. 
A Universal Service Contract was to be incorporated along side VISA to serve as 
a bridge between “current DOD peacetime commercial ocean and intermodal 
transportation services contracting practices and OSD determined acquisition policies.”24  




The contract would be implemented in two phases, USC1, tested from Feb to Sep 1998, 
and USC2, implemented in Oct of 1998.  The contract would also incorporate service 
contract standards to meet customer requirements currently designed to customer needs 
in specific service contracts.  Furthermore, USC1 would reflect executed Voluntary 
Enrollment Contracts (VEC) for VISA Stages I, II, and III to include basic activation 
procedures; DOD annual minimums for VISA Stages I, II, and III commitments (to 
include vessel capacity and intermodal systems); Stage III rate methodology; peacetime 
cargo allocation provisions; and on-the-shelf basic agreements (such as VISA Intermodal 
Contingency Contracts (VICC) for Stages I, II, and III).  The anticipated February 1, 
1998 implementation was critical because it provided an eight-month bridge between 
when the old contracts expired and the full VISA contract (USC2) would be awarded, in 
October 1998.  This allowed sufficient time to align the old contracts that expired into a 
single new contract for the customers.     
In September 1997, a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) plan was developed for 
VISA to determine the specific sealift capacity required to support two major theatre 
conflicts.  These CONOPS plans addressed all three stages of VISA and provided the 
framework JPAG would use in responding to a contingency.  Planners chose Korea and 
Southwest Asia to develop these CONOPS.  Choice of these regions reflect more 
accurately the current global threat than one derived from the Cold War. 
In early 1998, MTMC was working several VISA issues, specifically antitrust 
concerns, rate methodology to address port-to-port movement outside the continental 
U.S., and container pricing based on type, size and direction (of the containers).  
Contracting officers needed access to corporate information regarding carrier and 
expense data to offer fair and reasonable offers, but some carriers were unwilling to 
provide the data.  MTMC then had to create another pricing methodology for those 
uncooperative carriers.  MTMC later resolved to use current protocol in requesting 
sensitive data, and was more successful.  
By this time, the UCR and BVR both proved limited in their ability to enhance the 
acquisition process (for ocean and intermodal capabilities).  The preferred approach was 
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a “competitive, best value acquisition strategy”25 that would establish readiness, service, 
price, and past performance as award criteria.  Readiness would be achieved through the 
mandatory participation of certain carriers, and their pre-established minimum 
commitments to Stages I and II of VISA.  Contingency requirements (Stage III) would be 
contained in a separate contract that would be a prerequisite to obtaining peacetime 
business.  New rates developed for individual carriers, based on that company’s unique 
market experience, complied with the Maritime Security Act and created realistic 
compensation for carriers participating in VISA.  This reflected the consolidated 
capabilities modern day carriers used to integrate maritime shipping with trucking lines, 
port facilities and material handling equipment.  This intermodal capability could be 
tapped into by USTRANSCOM, eliminating separate agreements for those facilities. 
In June 1998, carriers enrolled in VISA were asked to select a rate methodology 
from three approved options: 
· Method A:  Revenue Based - an averaged rate calculated over a period 
of time 
· Method B:   Peacetime Rate Based - guaranteed a minimum profit level 
· Method C:   Negotiated Contingency Based - the carrier to negotiate all 
rates and expense deductions with the contracting officer 
The balance of 1998 was spent refining the rates necessary to provide the needed 
incentive for carriers to join VISA.  Incentives were those fees paid to the carriers 
carrying material during peacetime.  On two different occasions, the carriers hired third 
parties to provide independent rate analysis.  A chronology prepared by the 
USTRANSCOM Research Center archives outlines the results of the two studies:26 
McKenna & Cuneo, LLP: After the Government had initially proposed a 
15% incentive rate for Stage I and 10% for Stage II, the carriers presented 
the results of McKenna & Cuneo’s report, “Incentive and Compensation 
Package Analysis,” to USTRANSCOM.  This initial analysis proposed a 
400% incentive for both VISA Stages I and II, but did not appear to have a 
quantitative basis.   
A.T.Kearney:  After USTRANSCOM decided to limit incentives to no 
more than 30 percent, the carriers contracted with A.T. Kearney to provide 
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an objective analysis of fair and reasonable incentive payments for Stages 
I and II of VISA activation.  Kearney’s risk-based model addressed the 
significant business and financial risks faced by the carriers to include 
service disruption; customer response and disruption of global customer 
relationships; range of potential military scenarios; and lost business 
opportunity.  The model was designed to identify the incentive rate that 
would make the carriers indifferent to joining Stages I and II (much as if 
they were to make an investment decision) and included a Monte Carlo 
simulation to examine the probability that specific sets of assumptions 
would occur.  The model determined that the average VISA contingency 
price premium would be 411 percent.  Kearney maintained that the DOD 
Revenue Analysis Model significantly understated business risk by 
focusing only on a single military scenario; confining service disruption to 
only the single route in question; failing to cover lost business 
opportunities, and assuming that customers would not perceive increasing 
risk of service disruption prior to the military emergency. 
In September 1998, a DOD analysis team, chartered by TRANSCOM, was 
assigned to evaluate the carriers’ presentation on proposed incentives using factual data 
and historical documentation.  By replacing the assumptions of the A.T. Kearney model 
with “more appropriate” assumptions, the analysis found industry’s expectations of 400 
percent incentives to be unrealistic.  However, USTRANSCOM did feel incentives up to 
40 percent could be supported.  This 40 percent is added to an estimated 30 percent rate 
based methodology resulting in additional compensation of up to 70 percent of their 
peacetime costs for moving like material.  This incentive is intended to offset the 
business risks and extra expenses incurred by the carrier for committing to VISA. 
In late 1998, two carriers were involved in industry events relating to VISA.  Sea-
Land obtained an amendment to the Shipping Act of 1984 
authorizing a US flag vessel operator, in a vessel sharing agreement with a 
foreign flag operator, to prohibit the  foreign flag operator from the 
carriage of preference cargo in US flag space.  Essentially, this 
amendment allowed US flag carriers to close off potential competition for 
military cargoes from foreign flag lines that leased space on US subsidized 
vessels.27   
Two months later, in January of 1999, Mr. Frank Halliwell, the CEO of Lykes 
Lines Ltd., sent a letter to USTRANSCOM stating that he could not  
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commit his company to a contingency contract that threatens our 
commercial viability and gives credence to an emergency preparedness 
program that looks good on paper (at least to the military), but that cannot 
deliver the long-term contingency sealift capability that the military 
needs.28 
VISA was developed between 1991 and 1997.  Over this period, changes in the 
global environment shaped the way America would conduct military operations in 
various levels of intensity.  These environmental factors helped drive the changes in 
relationships between government and industry, becoming a more cooperative effort. 
Changes in the process by which sealift needs were assessed and contracted for redefined 
the roles of MARAD, MSC and USTRANSCOM in providing sealift capabilities to 
DOD, with VISA as the vehicle.   
 


























IV. ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FURTHER STUDY 
A. ANALYSIS 
· VISA was developed to ensure DOD can exploit commercial sealift 
capability when organic capabilities are insufficient 
Program incentives are revised annually, but the basic tenets remain in place. 
Activation, capacity required to commit and carrier risk clauses are all contained within 
the body of the VISA agreement between DOD, MARAD, and the maritime industry.  
The VISA Enrollment Contract (VEC) and the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Rate 
Agreement (VISRA) were created to address the specific details for each carrier.  Rates 
are determined upon enacting the program, and the carriers choose the rate methodology.  
As of 2001, the VISA program is in place but untested, as activation has never taken 
place.  
· This thesis was written to identify the events leading to the program’s 
inception and development, but it also provides a glimpse into U.S. 
military history, the changing global environment, and the role VISA 
will play in the future. 
A review of the history of VISA brings to light several important topics.  The 
military-industrial complex that dominated the postwar era expired soon after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall.  Big government funding big industry to make war materials has now 
evolved to contracting for services that were once provided within the Department of 
Defense.  Through MARAD, DOD renewed its relationship with the maritime industry, 
and VISA is the result of successful negotiations between the parties, but leaves open 
some areas that will only be answered by activating the program.  We will discuss these 
areas before forming conclusions and making recommendations for further study. 
· The shift from a Bipolar world to a unipolar world requiring 
America to respond to inestimable numbers, locations and 
types of conflicts may tax VISA’s sustainment capabilities 
The Cold War era demanded plans for two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.  
But the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ideology that it represented calls for new plans.  
The U.S. military would be asked to plan for threats in an unstable world.  The recent war 
on terrorism does not have a well-defined end state for the mission, and could easily 
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expand into multiple conflicts in diverse regions throughout the world.  This escalation 
will become part of our history, but how large is yet to be seen.  VISA has been 
developed to sustain military sealift transportation needs when organic and commercially 
contracted shipping becomes unavailable.   
· Use of foreign vessels and crews may compromise national 
security interests 
World War II saw America requisition foreign ships that were laid up in U.S. 
ports. Friendly governments cooperated with America, but some of the crews had 
different ideas and sabotaged their ships.  America made at least one direct plea, to 
Danish sailors, to remain with their vessels because they were familiar with operating 
them.  After WWII, American bases remained in Europe through the post-war rebuilding 
process.  They remained to bolster the weakened European nations in the uncomfortable 
shadow cast by the United Soviet Socialist Republic.  But the end of the Cold War 
reduced the need for large numbers of military members stationed overseas.  The 
anticipated charge through the Fulda Gap by the USSR will never happen. U.S. troops are 
now engaged in rapid deployments from U.S. shores, to respond to smaller contingencies 
and operations other than war.  The resulting loss of international relations with allies on 
the personal level may result in less empathy between us and our neighbors.  This loss of 
understanding, combined with events of September 11 may drive lack of understanding 
into mistrust.  VISA acknowledges our use of foreign flagged vessels, but will our 
neighbors be willing to let us use those vessels, and will the crews perform their jobs 
reliably and without malice in the future?29  
· Practice makes perfect; war games can provide valuable 
training and assess VISA’s ability to execute its mission 
During the 1996 war game, JPAG was successful at executing the different stages 
of VISA. The war games offered two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts in Southwest 
Asia and Korea.  Industry representatives participating in the war games were also part of 
the history of the development of VISA, and had clear understanding of the government’s 
needs.  VISA responded well to in the war game, with the participants in place in 1996.  
There is no guarantee that future participants will have a similar history of working with 
the government and may not be so successful.  War games exercising VISA should be 
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conducted annually to ensure 1) adequate knowledge and training on the part of industry, 
and 2) assess the VISA participants’ capabilities and limitations.   
· The ownership of vessels (and intermodal capabilities) enrolled 
in VISA needs to be re-defined to ensure national security 
needs are not compromised if Stage III of the program is 
activated 
During the 1996 war game, key members of JPAG included industry 
representatives who all met the security clearance levels necessary to work in concert 
with DOD.  Since September 11th, security measures have tightened and are not likely to 
change in the immediate future.  The U.S. needs to retain private ownership of significant 
sealift capacity in order to support military requirements during contingencies.   
· The VISA program is a fairly robust program that 
compensates carriers fairly and can be viewed as a successful 
compromise that shares risk proportionally between industry 
and DOD 
Ongoing rate discussions dominated much of VISA’s development.  Numerous 
factors are used in determining commercial cargo rates.  DOT and DOD were constrained 
in developing a method to pre-negotiate rates for Stage I and II activation, and these 
constraints resulted in offering three options from which a carrier could choose. These 
rates take into account a carrier’s desire to preserve privacy of internal cost mechanisms.  
While these rates are pre-negotiated, they are also governed by approved economic price 
adjustments, thereby mitigating risk to the carriers.  Their risk is also lessened by 
minimum activation times (60 days).  Reimbursable expenses include both war risk 
insurance and repositioning costs.  Pooling between carriers to protect commercial trade 
and breach of contract protection are also provided.   
· MSP is intertwined with VISA and must continue to guarantee 
participation by U.S. owned sealift capability 
Unlike CRAF, which can guarantee a minimum level of business during 
peacetime, VISA only offers priority status for carriers in competing for peacetime 
business.  A carrier voluntarily enrolled in VISA may not receive any benefits for 
maintaining a readiness commitment. (MSP ships are committed to VISA because they 
already receive a subsidy.  Refer to Appendix C for complete list.  When activated, 
though, carriers may receive up to 70 percent over peacetime rates and another 22 percent 
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over CONUS intermodal rates.  Because voluntary participants only receive opportunities 
to bid, they are not “compensated” for participation in the program unless VISA is 
enacted.   
· Though VISA is frequently compared to CRAF, the entire 
system of operations between aviation and the maritime 
industry are fundamentally different 
Unlike aircraft that can be relocated anywhere in the world within 24 hours, ships 
take much longer to relocate and, depending upon the ports available, take longer to 
offload and prepare for DOD’s use. Rates for the two programs had to be established 
based on different methodologies as well. CRAF participants have little competition from 
DOD assets - flying people and cargo does not vary between peace and war; whereas 
MSC must retain some capabilities, such as underway replenishment, not found in the 
private sector.  VISA requires intermodal capabilities by the carrier, but CRAF does not.  
DOD relieves the CRAF carrier of any forward movement of material, and assumes 
management once received at the airfield.   
· MARAD needs to provide sufficient oversight and incentives to 
ensure that there are sufficient vessels in the U.S. merchant 
fleet that balance both size and accessibility to overseas ports 
Even though the number of ships in the U.S. merchant fleet has decreased, these 
vessels have increased in size.  Tonnage capacities are at or near the levels they were in 
1988, when the U.S. fleet numbered 484 vessels, as opposed to today’s 226.  Increased 
vessel size limits the number of on- load and off- load ports, resulting in overland 
transportation or using smaller vessels to move material.   
· Industry and government need to form a joint training 
opportunity to sustain a pool of merchant seamen 
Fewer vessels also means the number of trained, qualified personnel have 
dwindled, leaving the Ready Reserve Force at a loss should the RRF be activated.  
During Desert Storm, many merchant seamen were called upon to activate the Ready 
Reserve Fleet, but training was inadequate, resulting in shortages in some engineering 
fields and officer levels. Seamen today are unfamiliar with operating older engineering 
plants, leaving many of the older vessels that make up the RRF difficult if not impossible 
to activate.  As the number of merchant seamen declines further, our ability to activate 
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the RRF may become problematic, requiring even greater reliance on existing 
commercial carriers.    
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The history of the VISA program highlights the  government’s efforts to work 
alongside industry to provide a capability in concert with private enterprise that could be 
utilized by DOD in times of conflict.  Various acts and policies have all affected the 
development of VISA and its creation.  To summarize, this paper the thesis questions are 
briefly answered:  
· What is the origin and current organization of the Voluntary 
Intermodal Sealift Agreement?   
VISA originated from the decision not to activate SRP during Desert Storm.  
After the Gulf War, MARAD conceived the VISA program and proposed it to 
USTRANSCOM.  VISA is organized as a three stage program, executed in concert with 
industry carriers, that offers time phased transition from peacetime, through increasing 
levels of conflict, to answer joint sealift requirements of the Department of Defense.  The 
program is jointly administered by USTRANSCOM and MARAD.  Activation authority 
for Stages I and II is held by USTRANSCOM, activation for Stage III is held by 
Secretary of Defense. (Appendix D - Activation Diagram)   
· Are the changes in VISA’s organization addressing the original intent 
of the agreement and does it currently meet that intent?   
Yes.  VISA was established to provide sealift capability to the Department of 
Defense during cont ingencies.  A limited number of ships are continuously available 
through their mandatory enrollment in the MSP.  VISA also allows for substituting 
foreign flagged vessels for U.S. flagged vessels to support cargo preference laws.   
· How has technology been incorporated in VISA’s operations?   
MSP ships enrolled in VISA are included in the Joint Operation, Planning and  
Execution System (JOPES).  JOPES utilizes Time Phased Force Deployment Data 
(TPFDD) to identify vessels available and their capacity.  Ships’ characteristics, such as 
capacity, speed, draft, etc., are included for military planners to determine which ships 
are best suited for different types of material (containerized, vehicles, ammunition, etc.). 
Voluntary participants can provide ships’ characteristics for subsequent profiling of that 
vessel.  This information is stored in a database for later recall when needed. 
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· How will VISA contribute to moving military material in the future?  
America’s current administration is intent upon winning the war on terrorism, but 
has admitted it will not be a quick and easy conquest.  Technically a military operation 
other than war (MOOTW), actions to neutralize or eliminate terrorism require plans that 
are far reaching in scope, including a sustained effort in forward deployed locations.  
These locations appear to frequently have low levels of technological sophistication and 
limited infrastructure that require forwarding material transported by sealift to the nearest 
port by intermodal systems.  VISA is designed to meet this requirement, but can only 
prove itself through execution.  
Events of September 11, 2001, demanded a military response from the United 
States.  But troops deployed to Afghanistan as a result of the attacks have all moved by 
organic capabilities or contracted on the market through competitive bidding.  
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM has not required the activation of any stage of 
VISA as yet.  However, if the War on Terror expands, potentially requiring military 
deployments to the Philippines, Somalia, Iraq and other nations harboring terrorists, the 
U.S. will find its national assets stretched, and the potential for reliance on VISA may 
increase.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
· A review of ships enrolled in MSP would provide clearer insight into 
the viability of their ownership 
Many foreign carriers have set up offices in the U.S. and are taking advantage of 
U.S. subsidies intended to sustain a U.S. owned fleet.  The actual status of these foreign 
owned companies, which may be owned or subsidized by their own governments, may or 
may not be useable assets if VISA were activated. 
· Manning of the merchant fleet directly impacts the availability of the 
Ready Reserve Fleet 
A large number of seamen remain available from the draw down of the military in 
recent years, but will probably not be fully replenished by future generations.  Not only 
numbers of available seamen, but skills necessary to activate older ships in the RRF are 
being lost, making the ability to activate those vessels questionable. 
· VISA should be reviewed on a regular basis to verify that it is capable 
of exploiting advances in technology, and to allow DOD to take 
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advantage of any financial savings resulting from technological 
change in the maritime industry 
Technology continues to evolve in both mechanisms for tracking material and 
shipbuilding construction.  DOD was a leader in technology in the postwar era, but is 
now increasingly dependent upon private industry for research and development in both 
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APPENDIX A.  U.S. MERCHANT FLEET (US FLAGGED AND 
FOREIGN FLAGGED – MARAD 2000) 
 
SHIP TYPE QUANTITY 
Containership 83 





     Break-bulk ships  
     Partial containerships  
     Refrigerated cargo ships  
     Barge carriers  
     Specialized cargo ships  
  
Total vessels 260 
 
U.S. GREAT LAKES FLEET  
 
Bulk 57* 
Tankers  4* 
Other  
     ITB Bulk carriers  7 
  
Total vessels 68 
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APPENDIX B.  VISA ACTIVATION PRIORITY 
PRIORITY CATEGORY 
1 U.S. Flag vessel capacity operated by a participant and U.S. Flag Vessel 
Sharing Agreement capacity of a participant 
2 U.S. Flag vessel operated by a non-participant 
3 Combination U.S./foreign flag vessel capacity operated by a participant 
and combination U.S./foreign flag VSA capacity of a participant  
4 Combination U.S./foreign flag vessel capacity operated by a non-
participant  
5 U.S. owned or operated foreign flag vessel capacity and VSA capacity 
of a participant 
6 U.S. owned or operated foreign flag vessel capacity and VSA capacity 
of a non-participant 
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APPENDIX C.  VISA PARTICIPANTS, 1997, 1998, 1999, AND 2000 
NAME 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Alaska Cargo Transport, Inc. X X X X 
American Auto Carriers X X   
American Automar, Inc.  X X X 
American Overseas Marine X    
American Presidents Line, Ltd. X X X X 
American Roll-On Roll-Off   X X 
American Ship Management, Inc.  X X X 
Automar International Car 
Carrier, Inc 
  X X 
Beyel Brothers, Inc.    X 
Central Gulf Lines, Inc X X X X 
Cook Inlet Marine    X 
Crowley American Transport, 
Inc 
X X X X 
Crowley Maritime Services, Inc.  X X X 
CSX Lines, LLC.    X 
Dixie Fuels II, Ltd.  X X X 
Double Eagle Marine/Caribe 
USA, Inc. 
 X X X 
Farrell Lines, Inc X X X X 
First American Bulk Carrier, 
Corp. 
 X X X 
First Ocean Bulk Carrier - I, LLC   X X 
First Ocean Bulk Carrier - II, 
LLC 
  X X 
First Ocean Bulk Carrier - III, 
LLC 
  X X 
Foss Maritime Company  X X X 
E-Ships, Inc.    X 
Gimrock Maritime, Inc.    X 
Liberty Shipping Group Limited 
Partnership 
   X 
Lynden Incorporated  X X X 
Likes Brothers Steamship X    
Lykes Lines Limited, LLC  X X X 
Maersk Lines Limited X X X X 
Matson Navigation Company, 
Inc.  
X X X X 
Maybank Shipping Company, 
Inc. 
 X X X 
McAllister Towing & 
Transportation 
 X X X 
Moby Marine Corp.  X X X 
NPR, Inc.  X X X 
OSG Car Carriers, Inc. X X X X 
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NAME 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Osprey Shipholding Corp., LLC. X X X X 
Red River Shipping X    
Resolve Towing & Salvage, Inc.  X X X 
Samson Tug & Barge Company, 
Inc. 
   X 
Seacor Marine International, Inc.  X X X 
Sealift, Inc. X X X X 
Sea-Land Service, Inc. X X X  
Smith Maritime  X X X 
Stevens Towing Co., Inc.    X 
Strong Virginian Navigation X    
Superior Marine Services, Inc.    X 
Totem Ocean Trailer Express, 
Inc. 
X X X X 
Trailer Bridge, Inc X X X X 
Transatlantic lines, LLC.    X 
Trico Marine Operators, Inc.  X X X 
Troika International, Ltd.  X X X 
Van Ommeran Shipping (USA) 
LLC 
X X X X 
Waterman Steamship Corp. X X X X 
Weeks Marine,Inc.  X X X 
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APPENDIX E.  VISA CHRONOLOGY  
(Revised Draft) 
 by Mark R. Esher, CAPT, USNR 
 
1967 After Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara recognized the need for 
some type of sealift augmentation during a less than full national emergency and that 
requisitioning was appropriate only for a full mobilization contingency, the Committee of 
American Steamship Lines proposed a program that would provide commercially owned 
and operated sealift resources to the Department of Defense (DOD) when needed, and 
according to prearranged procedures.  DOD then formally established the Commercial 
Sealift Augmentation Program (CSAP).  Beginning with its July 1969 contract 
solicitation for ocean services, the Military Sealift Command required that, to be eligible 
for an award, all ocean carriers had to commit ships to the CSAP.  At the time, the 
requirement did not specify a particular number or percentage of ships.  
 
1971 The Committee of American Steamship Lines was retitled as the Sealift 
Readiness Program, and the Military Sealift Command required ocean carriers to commit 
at least 50 percent of their US flag fleet as a condition of eligibility for the program.  
 
1978 The Maritime Appropriations Act directed that all vessels receiving either 
a federal construction or operating subsidy must be enrolled in the Sealift Readiness 
Program (SRP), whether or not they received Department of Defense peacetime business.  
Any call-up of ships under the SRP would be initiated by the Commander, Military 
Sealift Command, who determined that additional sealift would be required, and the 
Maritime Administration, which would assess the impact of the call-up on commercial 
trade. 
 
1981 The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Commerce signed a 
Memorandum of Agreement establishing civil shipping support for military contingency 
operations and the Sealift Readiness Program.  The Maritime Administration was 
subsequently transferred from the Department of Commerce to the Department of 
Transportation in 1982. 
 
1990 Although as many as 132 ships were committed to the Sealift Readiness 
Program (SRP), Military Sealift Command (MSC) did not call up any SRP ships in 
support of Operation Desert Shield or Desert Storm because of the general availability of 
charter ships--particularly from foreign sources--and space on US commercial vessels.  In 
fact, the charters gave MSC access to considerably more Roll-On/Roll-Off and breakbulk 
ships than did the SRP.  However, the question for later consideration would be whether 
such vessels would be so accessible in the future under different political or market 
conditions. (See 1992 LMI Study)  
 
09 Dec 91 The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) circulated 
an advance copy of a Maritime Administration (MARAD) draft proposal of a voluntary 
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agreement to make intermodal shipping services and equipment available to the 
Department of Defense as required to support the emergency deployment and 
sustainment of US forces.  This initial draft working copy, entitled “Voluntary Intermodal 
Sealift Agreement” (VISA), was the first use of the VISA title identified to date.  The 
memo also suggested the creation of a working group composed of USTRANSCOM, the 
Navy (N4-Logistics), Military Sealift Command (MSC), MARAD, and possibly industry 
representatives, to study the possibility of replacing the Sealift Readiness Program with a 
new voluntary program. 
 
Jan 92 Logistics Management Institute (LMI) published A Review of DoD’s 
[Department of Defense’s] Strategic Mobility Programs Commercial Sealift Support.  
This report, which was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Production 
and Logistics) and then forwarded to the Commander in Chief, United States 
Transportation Command, assessed DOD policies and practices for augmenting organic 
strategic sealift assets with commercial capabilities, and evaluated the overall utility of 
the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP).  The report stated that DOD needed to revitalize its 
SRP to meet the lift requirements of future emergencies and that the method the Military 
Sealift Command used to procure commercial sealift services (direct competitive 
bidding) precluded effective military/industry contingency planning, a key ingredient for 
a sound sealift augmentation program.  LMI recommendations included: (1) develop a 
strategy for the expanded use of container ships and container liner service, and 
incorporate worldwide intermodal transportation services into the SRP; (2) develop and 
test procedures for establishing long-term ocean transportation contracts with guaranteed 
tonnage and “constructed rates”; and (3) prepare DOD directive that would establish an 
expanded SRP, and seek to update the existing Memorandum of Understanding between 
DOD and the Department of Transportation concerning sealift augmentation. 
 
10 Mar 92 Navy Vice Admiral Francis R. Donovan, Commander, Military Sealift 
Command, expressed his view to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), that 
the Logistics Management Institute final report contained numerous inaccuracies, 
conflicting statements, and unsubstantiated conclusions, and should not be used as the 
sole basis for changes to Department of Defense (DOD) transportation policy.  Admiral 
Donovan had additional concerns about any sort of major procurement “reform” and was 
troubled over continuing assertions that price competition was somehow counter-
productive to the long-term interests of DOD or major shipping companies.  He also 
believed that any reduction in price competition would commit DOD to scrap the present 
procurement approach in favor of “constructed rates” (cost based ratemaking) predicated 
on ocean carrier participation in a restructured Sealift Readiness Program.  
 
21 Apr 92 The Joint Staff (VDL), tasked USTRANSCOM, under the purview of the 
Joint Staff and in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Navy, 
to evaluate the Department of Defense’s Sealift Readiness Program and sealift 
procurement, to include developing a strategy for expanded use of container ships and 
container liner service (all within the framework of the Mobility Requirements Study). 
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08 Jul 92 The Maritime Administrator, Navy Captain Warren G. Leback, forwarded 
a revised draft of the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement to Air Force General 
Hansford T. Johnson. Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command, for 
his review and comment.  Captain Leback also recommended that a joint working group 
be formed to review the draft and make changes towards a more workable agreement. 
 
23 Nov 92 Air Force General Ronald R. Fogleman, Commander in Chief, United 
States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), formally responded by letter to the 
Maritime Administrator’s revised Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) draft, 
stating that USTRANSCOM would continue to evaluate all options and alternatives to 
the Sealift Readiness Program in consultation with its components and with industry 
representatives of the National Defense Transportation Association Sealift Committee.  
He also indicated that VISA seemed to have merit and that other initiatives under 
consideration closely paralleled the basic tenets of VISA. 
 
08 Feb 93 (First?) Conference of Maritime Chief Executive Officers hosted by the 
United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).  Air Force General Ronald R. 
Fogleman, Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, presented the concept of a Civil 
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)- like sealift readiness program, and a proposal to proceed with 
an analysis of a constructed rate system and test plan.  Memorandum for the Record 
recognized that the Sealift Working Group was tasked to build a test plan to develop the 
objectives, methodology, measures of merit, and milestones for subsequent testing in a 
CRAF-like environment.  The National Defense Transportation Association’s Sealift 
Committee was tasked to look at Ready Reserve Force composition alternatives in the 
context of future needs and as force structure decisions continued to unfold.  The 
conference focused on the continuing evaluation of alternatives to sealift procurement 
and Sealift Readiness Program.  
 
21 Jan 94 In its final report, the Cost Data Model Team--consisting of 
representatives from Military Sealift Command (MSC), Price-Waterhouse, and the 
Department of Transportation’s Volpe Center--concluded that a cost based (Civil Reserve 
Air Fleet [CRAF]- like) rate system on all routes was not technically feasible and should 
not be pursued.  Because there were major differences in the way ocean carriers allocate 
various costs, as well as wide variances in carrier costs (dollar per container mile), the 
application of a constructed rate to several different ocean carriers would be too complex 
and inflexible.  The team recommended that improvements to the current competitive 
system be pursued.  The report also recommended further study by United States 
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and the National Defense Transportation 
Association, and their serious consideration of time-phased wartime commitments of 
shipping capacity with pre-negotiated rates.   
 
04 Feb 94 In a letter from Navy Vice Admiral Michael P. Kalleres, Commander, 
Military Sealift Command, to Air Force General Ronald R. Fogleman, Commander in 
Chief, United States Transportation Command, forwarded future meeting notes and 
recommendations concerning the development of a Civil Reserve Air Fleet-like sealift 
program in light of the Cost Data Model Team final report.  The Admiral’s briefing notes 
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included recommendations to consider joint planning with industry; the pooling of carrier 
assets to meet performance requirements; pre- lodged procurement pricing methods to 
enhance transition; reengineering the Sealift Readiness Program to better utilize 
commercial expertise and total intermodal infrastructure; participation incentives; and the 
possibility of prenegotiated overhead rates for contingency. 
 
09 Feb 94 At the Maritime Industry Chief Executive Officer Conference, Air Force 
General Ronald R. Fogleman, Commander in Chief, United States Transportation 
Command, directed Navy Vice Admiral Michael P. Kalleres, Commander, Military 
Sealift Command, to initiate a Sealift Readiness Improvement Study to improve 
procurement approaches for peace and war, reengineer the Sealift Readiness Program, 
and streamline business practices. 
 
30 Mar 94 Navy Vice Admiral Michael P. Kalleres, Commander, Military Sealift 
Command, provided Air Force General Ronald R. Fogleman, Commander in Chief, 
United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), a status report on the Sealift 
Readiness Improvement Study, which he had initiated in February.  The report included 
the highlights of the three working groups established by industry: Requirements 
Planning Group, Readiness Group, and Transportation Acquisition Process Group.  
Admiral Kalleres expressed his concern over the possible duplication of effort with 
respect to the Readiness Group in that even though it included representatives from the 
Maritime Administration and USTRANSCOM, there was evidently a parallel effort 
ongoing between the two organizations to develop a Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 
Agreement (VISA) to replace the Sealift Readiness Program.  He recommended that the 
VISA effort be merged into the Readiness Group.  
 
13 Apr 94 In a letter to Navy Vice Admiral Michael P. Kalleres, Commander, 
Military Sealift Command, Air Force General Ronald R. Fogleman, Commander in 
Chief, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), confirmed discussions 
between USTRANSCOM and the Maritime Administration (MARAD) concerning a 
draft Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA).  Retired Navy Vice Admiral 
Albert J. Herberger, former Maritime Administrator, initiated the discussion during his 
visit to USTRANSCOM in January.  General Fogleman stated that he believed the VISA 
initiative with MARAD would establish a statutory vehicle for joint planning and 
subsequent readiness agreements, and would be complementary to the Sealift Readiness 
Improvement Study.  He also stated that while USTRANSCOM was not yet ready to 
endorse it, the basic tenets of the draft VISA, with modifications, could support most 
Department of Defense mobilization objectives; and once a mutually agreeable joint 
planning arrangement had solidified, the readiness aspects of VISA should be worked out 
in the Readiness Group. 
 
15 Apr 94 Military Sealift Command (MSC) forwarded to Commander in Chief, 
United States Transportation Command, its review and comparison of the three sealift 
readiness programs under consideration:  Sealift Readiness Program (SRP), Voluntary 
Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), and the MSC-formulated Joint Planning 
Agreement (JPA).  Serving as an alternative to VISA, JPA would, according to MSC, 
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focus on joint planning, with participants developing plans of action covering various 
scenarios and contingencies.  It would be patterned after the way MSC provided 
peacetime sealift (and there would be contracts to order services planned for by JPA 
participants).  MSC would enhance current procurement policies and procedures which, 
when coupled with the JPA, would then constitute a sealift readiness program.  MSC 
recommended the incorporation of portions of VISA into the JPA, and then using both of 
them in conjunction with a revised SRP.  MSC argued that this would provide improved 
industry commitments, continuing Department of Defense (DOD) participation, and 
DOD rate control. 
 
[Explanation for following shift in COMSC position?] 
 
26 Apr 94 In a memorandum to the Director, Plans and Policy Directorate, United 
States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), Navy Vice Admiral Michael P. 
Kalleras, Commander, Military Sealift Command (MSC), stated that he saw “the merits 
in the proposed Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) of strengthening our 
maritime industry partnership and facilitating joint planning.”  Nevertheless, he believed 
certain issues still needed to be addressed including Secretary of Defense/Secretary of 
Transportation activation authority, clarification of rate setting methodology, contract 
commitments, and proportional contribution levels.  He was also concerned that a plan of 
action for determining rates still had to be worked out; that the Maritime Administration 
would administer the VISA program rather than MSC; and that MSC would no longer be 
the single point of contact for identifying commercial ships (though MSC would remain 
in charge of non-VISA ships and any foreign flag charters, and act as contracting officer 
for ships chartered for Department of Defense under the VISA program).  In spite of his 
ongoing concerns, the Admiral recommended endorsing “VISA, as revised by 
USTRANSCOM, as the joint planning vehicle in an adjunct capacity to a re-engineered 
SRP [Sealift Readiness Program].” 
 
29 Apr 94 In response to their expressed preference for the Maritime 
Administration’s Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) model, Air Force 
General Ronald R. Fogleman, Commander in Chief, United States Transportation 
Command (USTRANSCOM) underscored to both Mr. J. Hayashi, President and Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of American President Lines, Limited, and Mr. John Clancey, 
President and CEO of Sea-Land Services, Incorporated, USTRANSCOM’s position that 
the VISA concept was the most appropriate means for establishing a sound sealift 
readiness program to meet the needs of both the Department of Defense and industry.  He 
also told them that USTRANSCOM was committed to developing and testing the concept 
of a market based rate system as soon as possible.  In a personal note to Mr. Hayashi, 
General Fogleman stated that “I think we are very close to coming to closure on VISA as 
the program of choice.” 
 
06 May 94 After conferring with Navy Vice Admiral Michael P. Kalleres concerning 
his memorandum of 26 April, and reviewing the forwarding notes of the United States 
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) Director of Policy and Plans (Navy Rear 
Admiral William V. Cross), Army Lieutenant General Kenneth R. Wykle, Deputy 
48 
Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, inquired of his boss, General Ronald R. 
Fogleman, Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, as to whether he would be 
comfortable with VISA and with the much stronger role of the Maritime Administration 
(MARAD).  General Fogleman responded by personal note:  “Let’s do it!  Continue to 
work w/MARAD to get change in legislation agreed to.” 
 
10 May 94 In a letter to the Hon. Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States, 
Department of Justice, and in accordance with Section 708 of the Defense Production Act 
of 1950, Retired Navy Vice Admiral Albert. J. Herberger, Maritime Administrator, 
formally proposed the development of “a standby voluntary agreement for the 
contribution of intermodal shipping services/systems for national defense purposes.”  The 
letter requested her approval of the proposal and also enclosed a copy of the Maritime 
Administration’s Draft Working Paper (dated May 6, 1994) of the Voluntary Intermodal 
Sealift Agreement. 
 
09 Aug 94 The Hon. Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States, Department 
of Justice, formally approved the publication of the draft text of the Voluntary Intermodal 
Sealift Agreement in the Federal Register.  
 
17 Aug 94 Maritime Administration published its proposed draft text of the 
Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement in the Federal Register as “Voluntary 
Intermodal Sealift Agreement; Notice.” 
 
?? Oct 94 At the National Defense Transportation Association’s (NDTA’s) Sealift 
Committee Meeting, the principals agreed that senior leadership at all levels of the United 
States Transportation Command, the Maritime Administration, NDTA, and industry had 
to get personally involved in order to overcome the problems blocking further 
development of a program to replace the Sealift Readiness Program. 
 
23 Feb 95 In a Memorandum to the Joint Staff, Director of Logistics and the Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics), Army Lieutenant General Kenneth R. Wykle, 
Deputy Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command 
(USTRANSCOM), stated that USTRANSCOM was working with the Maritime 
Administration (MARAD) and Military Sealift Command (MSC) to modify and expand 
MARAD’s Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) to allow for pre-determined, 
staged activation of sealift capability to meet Department of Defense (DOD) 
requirements (in a “CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet]- like approach”).  He also stated that 
the Secretaries of Transportation and Defense would activate VISA upon a joint 
determination “when a dry cargo shipping capacity emergency exists and the capacity 
cannot be supplied through the commercial market or other voluntary arrangements.”  
Furthermore, he emphasized that prior to VISA activation, DOD requirements would be 
met through USTRANSCOM executed contracts that would be previously established 
under joint planning arrangements with industry and MARAD. 
 
02 Mar 95 In a Memorandum prepared for the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Vice 
Admiral William A. Earner, Jr., (N4-Logistics) stated that he believed that Retired Navy 
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Vice Admiral Albert J. Herberger, the Maritime Administrator, was “literally wedded to 
his VISA [Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement] program and accompanying subsidy, 
MSP [Maritime Subsidy Program]”.  He also believed that Vice Admiral Herberger was 
convinced that as the operating subsidy program expired over the next several years, US 
firms would transfer most of their liner ships from US to some foreign flags; and that the 
government would be able to retain control over these ships only through a voluntary, 
contractural agreement such as VISA.  Admiral Earner also stated his view that VISA 
would not work without the subsidy, but that he was increasingly concerned that the MSP 
subsidy (maybe $100 million) might become a Department of Defense or Department of 
Navy bill to pay. 
 
?? Mar 95 The National Defense Transportation Association’s Military Sealift 
Committee created an Executive Working Group (EWG) to work issues associated with 
developing and implementing a “CRAF-like” Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement 
(VISA).  Air Force General Rutherford, Commander in Chief (USTRANSCOM) tasked 
Army Lieutenant General Kenneth R. Wykle, Deputy Commander in Chief 
(USTRANSCOM) to chair the EWG.  Composed of representatives from Department of 
Defense, Department of Transportation, maritime labor, and shipping companies, the 
EWG would meet at least monthly, form subordinate working groups as needed, identify 
VISA concepts and issues, and draft a VISA document by May/June 1995.  EWG would 
also plan the VISA Venture 95 exercise. 
 
01 May 95 In a United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) Update, 
Army Lieutenant General Kenneth R. Wykle, Deputy Commander in Chief, 
USTRANSCOM, remarked on his meeting with Military Sealift Command (MSC) 
principal staff, concerning the proposed Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) 
document, that the “Price/Cost issue will require a change in philosophy-[a] change in the 
way of doing business.”  He stated that MSC staff wanted to obligate the contractor to 
provide assured access to the government, but that they also wanted “the government to 
be free to go on the open market at anytime to get the lowest tramp steamer or rogue ship 
that might be out there.”  He underscored USTRANSCOM’s position that if the 
government expected the carrier to sign up then the carriers must have assured access to 
government business.  However, if the carriers could not meet Department of Defense 
requirements, USTRANSCOM would then have the flexibility to go to the open market.  
General Wykle also had the impression that Navy Vice Admiral Phillip M. Quast, 
Commander, MSC, appeared increasingly flexible about changing the way MSC did 
business, but his civilian staff still seemed reluctant to change their past procedures. 
 
20 Jul 95 VISA Venture 95.  The first Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement 
(VISA) war game.  Two days in length, it was the first time that carriers and Department 
of Defense (DOD) used VISA processes and procedures to apply commercial sealift 
capacity to meet a single Major Regional Contingency (MRC) requirement.  
Representatives from DOD, industry, labor, Department of Transportation, and Maritime 
Administration participated.  Exercise objectives included identifying movement 
requirements, initia ting request for volunteers, and implementation of VISA Stages I, II, 
and III.  Exercise results indicated that the Joint Planning Advisory Group (consisting of 
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representatives of MARAD, USTRANSCOM, labor, and program participant operators) 
planning concept worked; Stages I and II were somewhat blurred; and, in general, 
industry supported Stage III. 
 
28 Jul 95 Proposed draft of United States Transportation Command’s 
(USTRANSCOM’s) Implementing Instructions to Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 
Agreement (VISA) addressed contracting methods, issues, and processes by which VISA 
participants would actually enter into contractural arrangements for the time-phased 
commitments of sealift capacity to meet Department of Defense (DOD) requirements.  
The document would also form the basis of a Memorandum of Agreement between 
USTRANSCOM and Program participants.  As to contracting methodology, price, level 
of service, and level of mobilization commitment for contingency capability would be 
accomplished and implemented in a peacetime contract(s).  Contracts would furnish 
participants with the capability to meet DOD requirements, and provide government and 
industry participants with a compensation rate and adjustment methodology in advance.  
The contracts would also give industry and government the ability to concentrate on 
executing the contingency mission rather than negotiating price and service at the time of 
the contingency. 
 
31 Jul 95 In a letter to Air Force General Robert L. Rutherford, Commander in 
Chief, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), Navy Vice Admiral 
Phillip M. Quast, Commander in Chief, Military sealift Command, concurred with the 
idea that Department of Defense (DOD) must be prepared to pay the carriers reasonable 
additional costs for the guaranteed contingency shipping capability.  Admiral Quast 
reaffirmed his support for Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement and proposed seeking 
regulatory or statutory changes that might allow for DOD to give preference to foreign 
flag ships owned by U.S. companies and operated by U.S. crews.  He also proposed a so 
called “readiness surtax,” which would consist of adding a cost per ton or cost per box to 
the base price of peacetime transportation. 
 
13 Aug 95 Department of Transportation approved Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 
Agreement document. (20 Sep 96 Chronology; cannot confirm?) 
 
22 Aug 95 Air Force General Robert L. Rutherford, Commander in Chief, United 
States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) informed Navy Commander Vice 
Admiral Phillip M. Quast, Commander, Military Sealift Command, that USTRANSCOM 
intended to implement a uniform rate concept for contracts in the Pacific which would 
coincide with the phased prototype implementation of the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 
Agreement readiness program. 
 
24 Aug 95 In a letter to Dr. Paul Kaminski, Under Secretay of Defense (Acquisition 
and Technology), who had raised earlier concerns as to whether the constructed rate 
approach would be cost effective for Department of Defense (DOD), Air Force General 
Robert L. Rutherford, Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command 
(USTRANSCOM), confirmed that industry Chief Executive Officers agreed to sign up 
for a one year Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) prototype implementation 
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plan.  Under that plan, carriers would be committing to VISA Stage III and to providing 
50 percent of their U.S. flag capacity to meet DOD requirements.  He also stated that, 
during this implementation period, USTRANSCOM would continue to coordinate and 
refine the VISA process, develop draft documents, validate Stage I and II DOD 
requirements, and determine a peacetime cargo allocation process in the Pacific (with Sea 
Land and American President Lines).  USTRANSCOM intended to fully implement 
VISA by October 1996.  General Rutherford reaffirmed his belief that the key to the 
Pacific test would be the development and implementation of a “constructed rate 
concept” (which was also referred to as the VISA uniform commercial rate).  
USTRANSCOM and Military Sealift Command, he continued, would work together the 
development of a Justification and Approval document required for a mobilization 
exception to full and open competition. 
 
15 Sep 95 Air Force General Robert Rutherford, Commander in Chief, United States 
Transportation Command, notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense 
that he had recently been informed by MARAD that the Department of Justice had given 
its approval to Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (and that approval provided the 
necessary authority under the Defense Production Act to allow carriers to team and pool 
their assets to meet DOD contingencies).  The CINC formally requested approval to 
allow VISA to satisfy the carriers’ Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) commitments during 
the one-year implementation period for those subsidized carriers who chose to join. 
 
10 Oct 95 Army General John M. D. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, approved the USTRANSCOM request to allow Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 
Agreement (VISA) to fulfill carriers’ Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) requirements 
during a one year implementation period. 
 
11 Oct 95 Department of Justice Antitrust Division granted written approval of the 
Maritime Administration’s revised proposal to develop a Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 
Agreement and recognized the proposed document as “the first official step in the 
development of a final voluntary agreement.”  
 
19 Oct 95 Modified text of the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement published in 
the Federal Register (with the notation tha t USTRANSCOM, DOJ, and FTC and formally 
concurred). 
 
30 Oct 95 The Secretary of Defense approved the USTRANSCOM proposal for 
Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) Stage III to satisfy ocean carriers’ 
existing commitments to the DOD Sealift Readiness Program on a trial basis for Fiscal 
Year 1996.  He also stated that he expected a VISA Stage III trial to provide a mechanism 
for refining Stages I and II, and to allow for joint planning between Department of 
Defense and industry carriers to meet contingency requirements.  The Secretary of 
Defense formally requested USTRANSCOM to fully evaluate the uniform commercial 
rate (UCR) and best value rate (BVR) ratemaking alternatives. 
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01 Nov 95 Draft Defense Contract Audit Agency audit, concerning the contractors’ 
proposal for a test of the uniform commercial rate pricing methodology in the Pacific 
theater, concluded that the suggested pricing mechanism did not result in a consistently 
reliable estimate of fair and reasonable constructed ocean or inland rates.  No favorable 
conclusions could be drawn concerning the overall fairness and reasonableness of the 
proposed pricing methodology. 
 
10 Nov 95  Twenty-two carriers signed up for the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 
Agreement Stage II prototype. 
 
14 Nov 95 In a letter to both Mr. John Clancey, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
Sea-Land Service, Incorporated, and Mr. Timothy Rhein, CEO of American President 
Lines, Limited, Air Force General Robert L. Rutherford, Commander in Chief, United 
States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), addressed their concerns about 
Military Sealift Command’s (MSC’s) overall commitment to previously negotiated 
Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) policy issues and MSC priorities 
affecting peacetime and wartime cargo.  He stated that “our fundamental principle 
remains that priority for peacetime and wartime cargo will be accorded to VISA 
participants, subject to cargo preference statutes, utilizing U.S. flag and foreign flag 
capacity controlled by participants.”  He also stated that USTRANSCOM would continue 
to work with MSC and the Executive Working Group to resolve the contractual issues 
associated with implementing such priorities. 
 
15 Nov 95 First Joint Planning Advisory Group (JPAG) meeting convened at the 
Maritime Administration (MARAD).  Meeting quarterly, JPAG agenda items would 
include JPAG operating procedures, Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) 
implementation plan, and the definition of wartime operational requirements.  The JPAG 
consisted of two co-chairs: the Maritime Administrator and Commander in Chief, United 
States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM); and representatives from MARAD, 
USTRANSCOM, program participant operators, and labor.  It provided the planning 
process to identify and discuss Department of Defense (DOD) sealift service and service 
requirements; matched peacetime requirements related to exercises and special 
movements with commercial capacity as a method to test wartime arrangements; 
recommended concepts of operations to meet peacetime and wartime requirements for 
use by contracting officers in developing contracts; and provided carriers an antitrust 
defense for pooling and teaming arrangements in support of DOD. 
 
13 Dec 95 Air Force General Robert L. Rutherford, Commander in Chief, United 
States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), updated Mr. John Clancey, Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of Sea-Land Service, Incorporated, and Mr. Timothy Rhein, 
CEO of American President Lines (APL), Limited, on the progress of the universal 
commercial rate (UCR) test in light of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) 
report in November.  He stated that USTRANSCOM had met with DCAA, Military 
Sealift Command, and representatives of APL to resolve and fix contested issues.  He did 
not believe that any of the remaining matters were showstoppers.  He also stated that he 
was looking for a decision point on the UCR test by mid-January of 1996. 
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5 Jan 96 In a letter to Dr. Paul Kaminski, Under Secretay of Defense (Acquisition 
and Technology), Air Force General Robert L. Rutherford, Commander in Chief, United 
States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) further described USTRANSCOM’s 
efforts to simultaneously develop two alternative contracting models.  The UCR model 
would be based upon a uniform rate applicable in peace and war (and determined by 
analyzing competitive prices in a broad marketplace), and the BVR model would be 
based upon a weighted evaluation of price and other factors, such as service and 
commitment to readiness (competitively offered by U.S. flag carriers).  General 
Rutherford also stated that the overall objectives remained a seamless transition from 
peace to war and minimizing contract activity in the midst of an emergency. 
 
29 Jan 96 In a Memorandum to the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, 
Transportation Policy (Logistics), Ms. Eleanor Spector, Director of Defense 
Procurement, expressed several reservations about the overall universal commercial rate 
(UCR) testing process, and she inquired as to why the UCR approach required an 
operational test, as opposed to a paper test.  She also stated that she was not as confident  
that the UCR pricing mechanism would produce only “minimal” additional costs during 
the testing period. 
 
31 Jan 96 In letters to Mr. John Clancey, President and CEO, Sea-Land Service, Inc., 
and Mr. Timothy Rhein, President and CEO, American President Lines, Inc., Vice 
Admiral P. M. Quast (Commander, Military Sealift Command) confirmed their previous 
discussions concerning MSC’s plan to transition from its current Worldwide Rate Guide 
competitive process into new streamlined processes, either Uniform Commercial Rate 
(UCR) or Best Value Rates (BVR), or both.  He also informed them that he had 
developed a plan to test both pricing methodologies and that he would be recommending 
a parallel test of both mechanisms on the Pacific trade routes (which had the existing 
advantages of competition for DOD cargo volume, sufficient carrier capacity, a diverse 
shipper marketplace, and real mobilization requirements). 
 
01 Mar 96 In letters to participating VISA CEOs, Army Lieutenant General Hubert 
Smith, Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command, advised all 
participants that USTRANSCOM had every intention to conduct “side by side” 
evaluations of the UCR and BVR processes on the Pacific trade routes.  Data collection 
on both tests would run through December 1996 with all DOD traffic on the Pacific 
routes divided equally between the UCR and BVR process.  The objective was to make a 
recommendation to DOD regarding implementation of either proposal not later than 
January 1997. 
 
04 Mar 96 In a letter to Air Force General Robert L. Rutherford, Commander in 
Chief, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), Mr. Paul Kaminski, 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) permitted testing of the 
universal commercial rate (UCR) and best value rate (BVR) process to continue; 
however, he stated that “it remains to be seen whether a negotiated rate should ever 
supplant a competitively arrived rate.”  He also stated that he was looking forward to 
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receiving a test plan from USTRANSCOM, which would provide criteria to evaluate the 
impact of the UCR and BVR concepts on streamlining Department of Defense 
acquisition, readiness, cost, and customer service. 
 
20 Mar 96 In a Talking Paper presented by the Office of the Chief Counsel 
(USTRANSCOM), concerning possible antitrust defenses provided to VISA participants 
through Section 708 of the Defense Production Act (DPA), USTRANSCOM was advised 
that the DPA authorized an antitrust defense for participants in a DOJ-approved 
“voluntary agreement”; and VISA, in its May 1995 form, was a DOJ approved 
“voluntary agreement”.  The DPA also authorized an antitrust defense for DOJ-approved 
“plans of action” that implemented VISA; and carrier protection agreements that 
provided for teaming, pooling, coordinated sailings, etc. would be considered “plans of 
action”.  USTRANSCOM was also advised to involve MARAD in further joint action to 
obtain greater DOJ flexibility in finally implementing DPA authority for VISA. 
 
26 Mar 96 Second Joint Planning Advisory Group convened 26-28 March to review 
overall Major Regional Contingency (MRC) requirements with VISA participants. 
 
05 Apr 96 In letters to both Mr. Timothy Rhein of American President Lines and Mr. 
John Clancey of Sea-Land Services, Air Force General Robert L. Rutherford, 
Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), 
confirmed that the second Joint Planning Advisory Group (JPAG) meeting had been 
completed successfully and, for the first time, Department of Defense and industry had 
shared details of specific movement requirements and operational scenarios in advance of 
an actual contingency.  He also stated that after many months of jointly working towards 
the implementation of UCR/VCR, they would soon be entering the final stage of that 
process.  He confirmed that DOD and industry continue to make progress towards a fully 
functioning JPAG, the VISA VENTURE exercise, and implementation of their 
contracting initiatives. 
 
30 Apr 96 VISA VENTURE 96, a Second Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement 
(VISA) war game held at United States Transportation Command.  Carriers and 
Department of Defense (DOD) worked sealift solutions to meet two nearly simultaneous 
Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) scenario.  Results of the exercise indicated that 
overall VISA structure and procedures were valid and that ammunition container 
availability was problematic.  Lessons learned included the need for pre-approved Carrier 
Coordination Agreements, statutory relief for backfill waivers, JPAG to define teaming 
requirements, and joint planning to minimizing disruption.  Recommendations included 
focusing future exercises on operational issues and linking future wargames to DOD 
command post exercises. 
 
31 May 96 Staff Summary Sheet from Chief Counsel (USTRANSCOM) presented 
UCR/BVR Assessment Plan and a Plan of Action for test plan execution to the 
USTRANSCOM DCINC for approval.  Carrier representatives had been provided a high 
level briefing on the various elements (Customer Service, Readiness, Process 
Streamlining, and Cost) at the EWG on 30 May. 
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10 July 96 Third Joint Planning Advisory Group convened 10-11 July to develop 
commercial sealift Concept of Operations (CONOPS) to meet DOD’s Korea and SWA 
ammunition requirements. 
 
11 July 96 In a letter to Army Lieutenant General Hubert G. Smith, Deputy 
Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command, the Hon. A. J. Herberger, Maritime 
Administrator, requested written confirmation of his understanding that, with regard to 
the proposed final VISA document, the Secretary of Transportation would allocate sealift 
assets committed by participants to Stage III once USCINCTRANS activated Stage III.  
MARAD maintained that it had the responsibility to ensure that the essential civilian 
economy was adequately served even during a national security emergency. 
 
15 July 96 In a letter to the Maritime Administrator, Army Lieutenant General Hubert 
G. Smith confirmed that USTRANSCOM changes to VISA Stage III activation language 
clearly explained that Stage III would be activated by USCINCTRANS upon approval by 
the Secretary of Defense and, upon activation, DOD would request the Secretary of 
Transportation to allocate sealift capacity.  General Smith made the point that the revised 
VISA language was now consistent with how USCINCTRANS and SECDEF activated 
the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). 
 
12 Aug 96 The Hon. Joan Yim, Acting Maritime Administrator, submitted the final 
text of the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement to Ms. Anne Bingaman, Assistant 
Attorney General, Antitrust Division (U.S. Dept. of Justice). 
 
12 Aug 96 Air Force General Walter Kross notified the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and the Secretary of Defense that the Maritime Administrator, on behalf of the 
Secretary of Transportation, approved the final VISA document, and submitted the 
agreement to the Justice Department for approval.  Accordingly, General Kross formally 
requested the approval of the Secretary of Defense to fully implement the final VISA 
program. 
 
12 Aug 96 Army Lieutenant General Hubert G. Smith, Deputy Commander in Chief, 
US Transportation Command, concurred with the recommendation of Navy Vice 
Admiral Philip Quast, Commander, Military Sealift Command, to extend the Uniform 
Commercial Rates and Best Value Rates (UCR/BVR) test contracts by an additional four 
months through 30 September 1997. 
 
13 Aug 96 In a letter to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Transportation 
Federico Pena expressed his continued support of VISA and reaffirmed that DOD would 
be responsible for activating VISA when normal commercial mechanisms to obtain 
sealift could not meet the military requirement.  The Maritime Administrator would then 
allocate vessels, sealift capacity, and intermodal assets consistent with procedures 




09 Sep 96 In a Memorandum to the Chief Counsel, USTRANSCOM, Ms. Joan 
Bondareff, Chief Counsel, Maritime Administration, confirmed that the authority to 
implement the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) had been specifically 
delegated to the Maritime Administrator.  Furthermore, the Secretary of Transportation 
had specifically delegated to MARAD authority over all aspects of Defense Production 
Act (DPA) voluntary agreements pertaining to shipping; and no other DOT modal 
administrator or department office had been delegated authority to implement Section 
708 of the DPA. 
 
13 Sep 96 In a Memorandum for the Office of Transportation Policy for the 
Secretary of Defense, Air Force Colonel Gilbert Regan, Chief Counsel, USTRANSCOM, 
confirmed that MARAD had been delegated sufficient legal authority to sponsor VISA, 
to sign VISA, and to implement the operational allocation responsibilities described in 
VISA. 
 
20 Sep 96 In a Memorandum to the Director of Logistics at the Joint Staff, Navy 
Captain T. L. Willis, Assistant to the CNO for JCS Matters, confirmed that Navy Staff 
recommended SECDEF extend the current VISA Agreement beyond the one year period 
as may be appropriate to provide USTRANSCOM and the ocean carriers time to 
complete the developmental evaluations of the VISA Agreement contracting 
methodologies and negotiation of the VISA prenegotiated contracts called for in the 
USTRANSCOM memorandum supporting the 1995 VISA Agreement.  He emphasized 
that only with completion of the evaluation and negotiations will all parties, including the 
Navy, be in a position to consider the costs and benefits involved in the full 
implementation of VISA. 
 
20 Sep 96 In response to the Navy’s position that SECDEF withhold approval for 
full implementation of VISA until such time as USTRANSCOM completed evaluation of 
the VISA contracting methodologies and negotiation of the prenegotiated contracts, Mr. 
Frank Weber, Deputy Director of Plans and Policy, USTRANSCOM, presented a talking 
paper that maintained that the VISA document was not designed to be a contract but 
rather a program framework MSC contracting officers would implement in accordance 
with approved contracting procedures and policies.  USTRANSCOM should also 
continue to emphasize that VISA provided pre-approved contingency access to 
commercial lift, maintained DOD contracting flexibility, and used approved contracting 
procedures.  The bottom line, according to Mr. Weber, was the VISA document 
adequately framed a program that DOD could reasonably expect to meet its readiness 
requirements at a fair and reasonable cost; and a delay in final approval would undermine 
DOD’s credibility in this overall effort with industry. 
 
18 Oct 96 In a letter to the Maritime Administrator, Mr. Joel Klein, Acting Assistant 
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, issued a determination that 
in accordance with the standards set forth in the Defense Production Act, the purposes of 
the VISA Agreement could not reasonably be achieved by a voluntary agreement or plan 
of action having less competitive effects, or without any voluntary agreement. 
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04 Dec 96 The Rate Methodology Working Group (RMWG), consisting of 
representatives from the Joint Traffic Management Office (JTMO), MARAD, and MSC, 
held its first meeting.  The Executive Working Group assigned it the task to complete a 
Stage III  contract by 04 Feb 97. 
 
09 Dec 96 Final Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) published by 
MARAD and USTRANSCOM. 
 
12 Dec 96 In a Memorandum for the USCINCTRANS concerning the Maritime 
Security Act (MSA) of 1996, the Secretary of Defense confirmed that USTRANSCOM 
would be his “representative to the Department of Transportation for subsequent 
implementation and administration of the MSA, in coordination with the Joint Staff and 
the OSD staff.” 
 
06 Jan 97 In response to the VISA Executive Working Group (EWG) directive to 
develop a draft VISA Stage III rate mechanism, the Rate Methodology Working Group 
(RMWG), consisting of representatives from the Joint Traffic Management Office 
(JTMO), MARAD, and MSC, met 06-09 January 1997 to discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of numerous VISA contingency rate methodologies.  The RMWG 
requested participating shipping companies to provide business sensitive operating, 
revenue, and expense data for each specific vessel. 
 
30 Jan 97 In a Memorandum to USCINCTRANS, SECDEF approved the full 
implementation of the VISA Agreement as an alternative to the Sealift Readiness 
Program. 
 
05 Feb 97 Parallel assessment of Uniform Commercial Rate (UCR) and Best Value 
rate (BVR) methodologies began in the Pacific theater with Sea-Land and American 
President Lines and continued through 08 October.  Key metrics in the analysis were 
readiness, cost, improved service, and process streamlining. 
 
13 Feb 97 The Maritime Administration announced the implementation of the 
Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement and the Federal Register published the final text. 
 
21 Feb 97 Through letters to participating carriers, the Mobility Analysis Division of 
USTRANSCOM’s Plans and Policy Directorate solicited updates of Stage III capacity 
numbers so that the Joint Traffic Management Office could complete the process of 
preparing the interim VISA Enrollment Contracts (VEC). 
 
10 Apr 97 National Defense Transportation Association (NDTA) Military Sealift 
Committee CEO Meeting at Scott AFB, Illinois, the first CEO meeting since the 
Secretary of Defense approved the VISA document for full implementation.  
USTRANSCOM announced that capacity sizing for VISA Stages I and II had been 
changed to 15 percent and 40 percent respectively.  As to the status of Stage III rate 
making methodology, the Rate Making Working Group (RMWG) confirmed that a 
revenue based approached (baselined on carriers’ revenue accounting data) was being 
58 
used to develop two types of rates: a revenue per slot rate for on route liner service and a 
per diem rate for off route charter service.  The calculation of those rates should be 
completed by July 1997, and the rates would be tested for use in VISA Stage I and II 
contracts.  A report on the progress of UCR/BVR indicated that the goal of both contracts 
was to facilitate implementation of the readiness program using a streamlined liner 
service acquisition process.  UCR focused on utilizing the best commercial practices 
while BVR captured the benefit of competition where it exists.  More time was needed to 
complete the UCR/BVR assessment process. 
 
14 Apr 97 In a Policy Memorandum to Commander, Military Sealift Command and 
Commander, Military Traffic Management Command, USCINCTRANS, Air Force 
General Walter Kross, set out the prioritized order for utilization of commercial sealift 
capacity to meet DOD peacetime and contingency contract requirements:  first priority 
would be for US flag vessel capacity operated by a VISA participant and US Flag Vessel 
Sharing Agreement capacity of a participant, and last priority for foreign-owned or 
operated foreign flag vessel capacity of a non-participant). 
 
22 Apr 97 In a Memorandum to Commander, Military Sealift Command (MSC), and 
Commander, Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), Army Lieutenant 
General Hubert G. Smith, Deputy Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, confirmed that 
the Universal Service Contract (USC) represented the next major step in the collective 
efforts to streamline the sealift acquisition process and improve service to customers.  
USTRANSCOM tasked MTMC as the lead agent for USC transition and implementation, 
with MSC and USTRANSCOM staff to support as required. 
 
29 Apr 97 UCR and BVR Assessment Report published by the Volpe National 
Transportation Systems Center, Department of Transportation.  One aspect of VISA was 
an innovative peacetime contracting approach linking USTRANSCOM and the US ocean 
carriers to contingency requirements.  Within VISA, the two contracting approaches for 
procuring intermodal, end-to-end ocean transportation service for DOD containerized 
cargo were being operationally tested and were being applied to DOD container cargo 
moving between the west coast and the Pacific Far East.  The Uniform Commercial Rate 
contract became operationally effective June 1996 and the Best Value Rate became 
effective February 1997.  This report was the primary assessment of the UCR and BVR 
contracting methodology test and would serve as the basis of USTRANSCOM’s 
subsequent report to OSD.  Four major areas were assessed:  Service Improvement, Cost 
Assessment, Readiness, and Streamlined Acquisition.  
 
19 May 97 Rate Methodology Working Group (RMWG) submitted proposed 
methodology, instructions, and procedures for calculating VISA Stage III rates (per 
shipment and per diem) to the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) for review and 
analysis.  DCAA specifically requested to review if:  1) each carrier’s accounting system 
was capable of providing the required data; 2) the actual revenue and expense data 
provided by each carrier was accurate and complete; 3) the methodology itself was 
capable of consistently producing rates; and 4) the carriers and the government had the 
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same understanding of what data needed to be submitted, how it was to be analyzed, and 
how rates were to be computed. 
 
02 Jun 97 DCAA began carrier audits two months later than planned due to late 
carrier data submissions and the need for the RMWG to resolve problems with data. 
 
06 Jun 97 Benchmark contract awarded to Law and Economics Consulting group 
(LECG), with a final report due by 15 August.  Original start date was delayed two 
months due to late carrier data submissions. 
 
25 June 97 In a point paper (attachment #4 of a Memorandum from Rear Admiral 
Richard Naughton, Director, Plans and Policy, USTRANSCOM, to MTMC, MSC, and 
MARAD, the JTMO confirmed its understanding of USTRANSCOM expectations and 
goals with regard to implementing desired VISA features within the Universal Service 
Contract.  USC1 would be a bridge peacetime contract between current DOD peacetime 
commercial ocean and intermodal transportation services contracting practices and OSD 
determined acquisition policies (based on la ter decisions concerning competitive (BVR) 
vs. non-competitive (UCR) procurement methodologies).  USC1 would be effective 
between 01 Feb 98 and 30 Sep 98 and a follow-on USC2 would operate between 01 Oct 
98 and 30 Sep 99.  USC1 would also incorporate service contract standards to meet 
customer requirements currently designed to customer needs in specific service contracts.  
Furthermore, USC1 would reflect executed Voluntary Enrollment Contracts (VEC) for 
VISA Stages I, II, and III to include basic activation procedures; DOD annual minimums 
for VISA Stages I, II, and III commitments (to include vessel capacity and intermodal 
systems); Stage III rate methodology; peacetime cargo allocation provisions; and on-the-
shelf basic agreements (such as VISA Intermodal Contingency Contracts (VICC) for 
Stages I, II, and III). 
 
29 Jul 97 LECG contract extended due to carriers’ failure to release proprietary 
data.  Final report expected 30 September.  
 
27 Aug 97 VISA (Government) Executive Level Meeting to develop key 
USTRANSCOM and MARAD positions in preparation for the 18 September NDTA 
CEO Sealift Conference and to reemphasize the importance of committing the resources 
required to meet VISA timelines. USTRANSCOM’s Deputy Commander in Chief 
requested the meeting.  COMSC, CDR MTMC, and several other higher level military 
and civilian officials of MARAD, USTRANSCOM and MTMC attended.  A key concern 
was the timeline for issuing the FY98 peacetime contract RFP (now called the Universal 
Service Contract 1).  USC1 was envisioned to be the first peacetime contract that started 
the transition from the traditional JTMO Global and Services Contracts to a more 
streamlined VISA peacetime contract.  [USC1 was to incorporate several VISA features 
(readiness commitments; best value contract consideration for price, service, and 
commitment, etc.) and also allow for combining global contract and service contract 
features under one contract.  The anticipated implementation date of 01 February was 
critical because it would provide an eight month bridge between when the old contracts 
expired and the full VISA contract (USC2) would be awarded in October 1998 to align 
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expired contracts into a single contract for the customers.  USC1 was awarded on time; 
however, it would not include all the features originally intended.  For example, USC1’s 
commitment would be for Stage III only and would not include the “best value” concept 
(which would have selected carriers for cargo award based on price, service, and level of 
commitment to the VISA program).]  The meeting also revealed that the Rate 
Methodology Working Group (RMWG) anticipated the delivery of the final draft of the 
Stage III rate methodology to the EWG in December 1997 (with the results intended to 
be incorporated into the USC2 final contract).  The UCR/BVR evaluation process would 
continue. 
 
29 Aug 97 RMWG completed first internal working draft of the VISA Stage III rate 
methodology.  DCAA completed its audits of carriers. 
 
16 Sep 97 Fax from Sea- land purporting to be from the CEOs of participating VISA 
carriers expressed several concerns about the overall health of the VISA partnership to 
include the decrease in the peacetime cargo base; the perceived fragmentation of overall 
DOD policy actions specifically with regard to the Federal Streamlining Acquisition Act 
and the application of DOD Directive 4500.9; and DOD actions to reduce overall 
transportation costs and the “fragmented” transition of the intermodal sealift acquisition 
process from MSC to JTMO (which had the components competing with one another for 
limited DOD transportation funds).  
 
18 Sep 97 NDTA CEO Sealift Committee Meeting-VISA In progress Review. 
Agenda items included the VISA enrollment status and process; Stage III rating 
methodology report; and the status of the Universal Service Contract. 
 
30 Sep 97 Publication of Defense Transportation System (DTS)-Functional Process 
Improvement (FPI):  Technical Report Study/Services (Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 
Agreement Concept of Operations).  Science Applications International Corporation 
(SAIC), as the subcontractor of Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC), developed a 
VISA Concept of Operations (CONOPS) plan for USTRANSCOM to provide specific 
amounts of commercial US flag sealift capacity for the two major regional operational 
plans (OPLANS) of Korea and Southwest Asia.  The CONOPS would be used by 
USTRANSCOM’s Mobility Control Center (MCC), MTMC, MSC, and MARAD to meet 
DOD contingency sealift requirements.  The report also outlined several 
recommendations for implementing the VISA CONOPS into USTRANSCOM planning 
and execution procedures. 
 
?? Sep 97 In a briefing prepared by the Joint Traffic Management Office entitled 
“VISA Universal Service Contract:  Best Value for the Customer,” the JTMO advocated 
a phased approach to Best Value.  With Universal Service Contract (USC1), the VISA 
participant would be contractually bound for a VISA Stage III commitment and the 
competitive criteria would be a low cost, technically acceptable service.  With USC2, the 
VISA participant would be bound for VISA Stages I, II, and III commitments; and the 
competitive award criteria would be Best Value (readiness, service, and price).  
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08 Oct 97 Completion of the parallel assessment of UCR and BVR methodologies in 
the Pacific theater which had begun on 05 February and involved Sea-Land and 
American President Lines.  USTRANSCOM shipped approximately 9,000 containers on 
each contract over this assessment period.  Initial conclusion was that in a global 
environment neither UCR nor BVR, in present form, represented viable opportunities for 
enhancing the acquisition process supporting VISA. 
 
09 Oct 97 LECG contract extended for a second time due to carriers’ failure to 
release data in a timely manner.  Final report expected by 31 October. 
 
29 Oct 97 NDTA CEO Sealift Committee meeting-VISA Update.  USTRANSCOM 
confirmed its direction to MSC and MTMC to ensure that VISA partners were given 
priority consideration for DOD cargo; its request of OSD/TP (Office of Transportation 
Policy) to look at policies and opportunities to increase DOD peacetime cargo available 
for VISA partners; and its effort to refocus the Executive Working Group (EWG).  EWG 
members acknowledged the industry’s expectation that VISA would minimize risks 
associated with contingency activations and ensure maximum peacetime business; and 
confirmed the DOD expectation that VISA would provide assured access to US flag fleet 
capacity to meet contingency requirements. 
 
07 Nov 97 Rate Methodology Working Group completed the second working draft of 
the VISA Stage III rate methodology and forwarded it to the EWG for review and 
comment.  The methodology developed two types of rates: unit and per diem.  The unit 
rate applied to individual cargo shipments, and the per diem rate to vessel time charters.  
There were three types of unit rates:  container, measurement ton, and square foot.  Rates 
were specific to both carrier and vessel string. 
 
12 Nov 97 In a letter to Mr. Joseph Sanders, President, Alaska Cargo Transport, Inc., 
Air Force General Walter Kross, USCINCTRANS, told Sanders he had assigned the 
USTRANSCOM Acquisition Oversight Group (AOG) the mission of providing strategic 
guidance, acquisition oversight, and expertise for VISA contracting efforts; and their 
primary effort would be to ensure that the solicitation for the Universal Service Contract 
2 (USC2) was issued complete and on time in spring 1998, and that it incorporated 
lessons learned from the current USC1 solicitation. 
 
15 Dec 97 RMWG completed rate unit and charter rate analysis by comparing 
benchmark rates with rate methodology and past contract rates. 
 
16 Dec 97 Law and Economics Consulting Group (LECG), Inc., submitted its final 
report, “An Analytical and Empirical Evaluation of the Proposed VISA Stage III 
Contingency Ratemaking Methodology.”  Assessing the VISA rate methodology 
proposed by the RMWG, the report concluded that the benchmark rates contained in this 
study provided a reasonable benchmark against which the determination of Stage III rates 
could be evaluated; however, the rate methodology produced actual carrier rates that 
would be higher than benchmark rates.  Furthermore, the report also concluded that 
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DOD’s ability to negotiate Stage I and Stage II rates on the basis of full knowledge was 
severely impaired. 
 
15 Jan 98 Memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and 
Technology) established DOD acquisition policy for transportation and related services.  
The policy balanced acquisition reform and readiness goals to improve the quality of 
transportation services provided by DOD; required the use of best commercial practices 
and best value evaluation procedures when acquiring transportation services under both 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and FAR-exempt processes; and required 
commercial transportation providers to commit to participate in one of the readiness 
programs (to include VISA) as a condition for receiving DOD business.   
 
26 Jan 98 In a letter to Mr. Tim Rhein, President and CEO, American President 
Lines, Ltd., USCINCTRANS, Air Force General Walter Kross, explained that USC2 
would be the first major “best value” procurement for sealift services.  He emphasized 
that the principal strategic tenets for USC2 were the equitable allocation of cargo based 
on readiness commitment and a revenue-based contingency rate methodology (a 
derivative of the UCR) that met the spirit and intent of VISA and the Maritime Security 
Program.  He also stated that, based upon lessons learned from the UCR and BVR tests, 
USTRANSCOM was developing a best value, peacetime acquisition strategy for USC2, 
which established readiness, service, price, and past performance as award criteria. 
 
05 Feb 98 A letter from Mr. William Lucas (Deputy to the Commander of MTMC) 
to Mr. Frank Weber (TCJ4-D, USTRANSCOM) concerning MTMC’s unified position on 
VISA implementation issues made the following points:  MTMC/TCJA was working the 
possible antitrust issues; the rate methodology’s average revenue concept was acceptable 
but need to be refined to exclude revenue earned between OCONUS inter-port 
movements and unit rates needed to be recalculated based on direction, size, and type of 
container; the rate methodology could not exclude the contracting officer from reviewing 
carrier and expense data; and that MTMC need to address an alternative methodology for 
those carriers who couldn’t and wouldn’t provide data (and what would constitute 
benchmark rates for them). 
 
09 Feb 98 The Rate Methodology Working Group submitted the third revision of the 
VISA Stage III rate methodology (from the original November 7, 1997 draft) for the 
review and comment of the members of the Executive Working Group.  Major revisions 
included a requirement to price unit rates by direction, and container rates by both 
direction and size/type. 
 
17 Feb 98 In a Memorandum to the Vice Commander of AMC, the Commander 
MSC, and the Commander MTMC, USTRANSCOM’s Deputy Commander in Chief, 
Army Lieutenant General Roger G. Thompson, Jr., forwarded a 15 Jan 98 memo (see 
above entry) and directed his component commanders to implement this transportation 
acquisition policy immediately. 
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25 Feb 98 In a Memorandum to the Chairman of the JCS and the Secretary of 
Defense, USCINCTRANS, Air Force General Walter Kross, formally responded to the 
Secretary’s memorandum of 30 Jan 97 approving VISA and requesting information on 
the evaluation and future direction of the acquisition process which would support VISA.  
General Kross’s bottom line conclusion was that in a global environment neither UCR 
nor BVR, in present form, represented viable opportunities for enhancing the acquisition 
process.  He also stated that based on experience and lessons learned with UCR and 
BVR, USTRANSCOM would work towards a “competitive, best value acquisition 
strategy” that would establish readiness, service, price, and past performance as award 
criteria.  Readiness would be achieved by mandatory participation and pre-established 
minimum commitments to Stages I and II of VISA; and contingency requirements would 
be contained in a separate contract vehicle which would be a prerequisite to obtaining 
peacetime business.  General Kross went on to state that since it was now understood that 
there was a benefit to using the commercial market as a baseline to negotiate DOD 
peacetime rates, USTRANSCOM would be tailoring the process to focus on developing 
individual company commercial rates (based on a company’s unique market experience) 
for contingency application.  He firmly believed that the use of individual commercial 
rates complied with the Maritime Security Act and offered companies of differing sizes 
and efficiency realistic compensation for participating in VISA. 
 
02 Mar 98 In a staff summary sheet response to a DCINC tasker to provide 
information concerning the history of the RMWG and the current status of VISA Stage 
III Rate Methodology, USTRANSCOM’s Director of Plans and Policy, Navy Rear 
Admiral Richard Naughton, confirmed that VISA Stage III Rate Methodology would 
satisfy the requirements of Section 653(c) of the Maritime Security Act of 1996 
(requiring MSP subsidized carriers participating in an emergency preparedness program 
to be paid not less than commercial market charges for like transportation resources, and 
to be paid all carrier costs associated with the provision and use of the carrier’s resources 
during a contingency).  He also stated that it remained his intention to include VISA 
Stages I, II, and III in the USC2 solicitation in order to provide carriers the compensation 
they were looking for prior to signing up to the three VISA stages. 
 
10 Mar 98 In a Memorandum to VISA Participants, MTMC/JTMO announced that 
USTRANSCOM and MTMC had determined that ocean and intermodal transportation 
services provided under VISA qualified as “commercial items” as defined in FAR 
Section 2.101.  As such, the Contracting Officer for Universal Service Contract 2 (USC2) 
and other MTMC contracts which incorporate VISA and it associated Contingency Rate 
methodology would not obtain certified cost and pricing data from offerors in 
determining whether Contingency Rates generated from the proposed VISA Stage III rate 
methodology were fair and reasonable.  However, the Contracting Officer might have to 
require information other than certified cost and pricing data to support a determination 
of price reasonableness or cost realism. 
 
12 Mar 98 Fourth revised draft of the VISA Stage III Rate methodology forwarded to 
the EWG and VISA carriers for review and comment.  Draft included all written and 
verbal comments and recommendations made by EWG members to date, and 
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incorporated several major changes discussed at the 06 March meeting of the EWG:  
revised language that gave the Contracting Officer a right to review carrier data 
consistent with established protocols; additional requirement to include inter-port cargo 
handling expenses when calculating unit rates; and revised language that required the 
carrier and the government to negotiate firm fixed prices for certain services (rather that 
actual cost reimbursement). 
 
18 Mar 98 In a Memorandum to Commander, MTMC, USCINCTRANS, Air Force 
General Walter Kross, reaffirmed that the USC2 was the single largest sealift contracting 
instrument within USTRANSCOM and could fundamentally shape the strategic 
relationship with industry.  General Kross also summarized his guidance and policy 
expectations that were designed to ensure that peacetime contracting methodologies 
employed by Transportation Component Commands support and promote overall 
strategic objectives and policies. 
 
20 Apr 98 NDTA VISA CEO’s Meeting.  Members decided to:  postpone USC02 
peacetime contract implementation until April 1999; establish a joint 
government/industry working group to develop and implement VISA contingency 
contracts by October 1998; and establish a second joint government/industry working 
group to develop a Best Value procurement for implementation in April 1999. 
 
04 May 98 Seven VISA carriers sent a letter to USTRANSCOM’s DCINC, Army 
Lieutenant General Roger G. Thompson, Jr., formally agreeing to what they understood 
to be USTRANSCOM’s request to extend the USC1 for six more months (beyond 01 
October).  The carriers also confirmed their general understanding that the extension was 
necessary because of the urgency of finalizing the VISA Stage III Rate methodology by 
May 1998 and because more time was required for the structuring and refinement of the 
USC2 Best Value solicitation. 
 
13 May 98 Seven VISA carriers sent a letter to USTRANSCOM’s DCINC, Army 
Lieutenant General Roger G. Thompson, Jr., confirming their consensus that the Best 
Value process was the logical vehicle to facilitate the move away from DOD’s current 
low price award system.  They also stated that they believed that a complete reworking of 
the current USC2 draft was necessary and that rewording any given section of the RFP 
would be counterproductive and only serve to frustrate the entire process. 
 
01 Jun 98 In a letter from the MTMC Contracting Officer, (MTAQ-J), VISA carriers 
were asked to select from one of the three approved rate methodologies for Stage III 
services (even though two of the three were still in the final stages of approval):  Method 
A (Revenue Based); Method B (Peacetime Rate Based); and Method C (Negotiated 
Contingency Rate).  One change to Method B would give the carrier a choice between 
using the DCAA to verify expense date or directly negotiating expenses with the 
contracting officer.  Method C required the carrier to negotiate all rates and expense 
deductions with the contracting officer. 
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05 Jun 98 In a Memorandum to Commander, MTMC, Mr. Paul Hoeper, Assistant 
Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition) formally issued a Class 
Justification and Approval (J&A) for other than full and open competition for the 
acquisition of ocean and intermodal services for the Department of Defense.  The 
approval was contingent upon MTMC preparing and approving an acquisition plan for 
those ocean and intermodal services prior to the release of any solicitations resulting from 
the J&A. 
 
19 Jun 98 In a cover letter from Mr. Kenneth Gaulden (Government Marketing) of 
Sea-land, Inc., the Voluntary Contingency Contract (VCC) Working Group presented its 
Vision to LTG Roger Thompson. This Vision included the carriers’ specific 
understanding of the complete VCC process from peacetime through all activation phases 
of VISA. 
 
02 Jul 98 In a Memorandum to the Commander, MTMC, Army Lieutenant General 
Roger G. Thompson, Jr., Deputy Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, provided 
preliminary guidance concerning VISA Stage commitment levels and incentive fees for 
Stages I and II, to include specific data concerning VISA Stage commitment levels and 
guidance for VISA Stage I and II rate incentives for input to the VISA Contingency 
Contract (VCC).  While the VISA rate methodology compensated VISA carriers for their 
services during a contingency, in addition to the established rates, the incentive fee would  
be added to the Stage I and II rates to reward carrier efforts and commitments to meet 
DOD’s time critical contingency requirements.  The tentative baseline incentive fees to 
be reviewed for use during Stages I and II were 15 percent and 10 percent of the  Stage III 
rates, respectively.  This memorandum and attachments also addressed VISA activation 
in that MARAD and USTRANSCOM, after a year of analysis and coordination with the 
carriers, determined each carrier’s capacity commitment level for VISA Stage III.  The 
attached commitment levels for VISA Stage III were approved for FY99. 
 
15 Jul 98 The EWG carriers submitted a revised VISA Vision for the Voluntary 
Contingency Contract to Army Lieutenant General Roger G. Thompson, Jr., Deputy 
Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM. 
 
28 Jul 98 Progress Report on the Development of Contingency and Peacetime 
Contracts for Military Cargo prepared by carriers actively participating in the Voluntary 
Contingency Contract Working Group, USC02 Working Group, and the Executive 
Working Group (with copies provided to senior leadership at USTRANSCOM).  The 
report highlighted major differences between military and carrier views of many 
economic and management issues.  
 
17 Aug 98 In a letter to Mr. Joseph Sanders, President of Alaska Cargo Transports, 
Inc., Air Force General Charles T. Robertson, Jr., Commander in Chief, 
USTRANSCOM, formally responded to a Progress Report on the Development of 
Contingency Peacetime Contracts for Military Cargo, (see above entry).  General 
Robertson made the point that the Progress Report might not have presented a full 
picture, and that it appeared to understate the achievements to date, minimized the 
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complexity of the issues being addressed, and presented an inaccurate picture of the 
current status of VISA efforts.  He attached a USTRANSCOM Staff Assessment of VISA 
Implementation for review by the carriers. 
 
18 Aug 98 (After the Government had initially proposed a 15% incentive rate for 
Stage I and 10% for Stage II) The carriers presented an Incentive and 
Compensation Package Analysis, prepared by McKenna & Cuneo, LLP, to 
USTRANSCOM.  This initial analysis proposed a 400% incentive for both VISA 
Stages I and II, but did not appear to have a quantitative basis.  this isn’t on the 
paper copy and doesn’t make much sense--peg 
 
02 Sep 98 In a letter to Mr. William Lucas, Deputy to the Commander, MTMC, Mr. 
James Caponiti, Associate Administrator for National Security, MARAD, expressed his 
reservations concerning the draft VISA Enrollment Contract (VEC), posted on 21 
August, which did not afford the Maritime Administration the opportunity to sign or co-
sign the VEC with DOD.  He also pointed out that with the emergence of DOD’s VISA 
Contingency Contract (VCC) and its Drytime Contingency Contract (DCC), and the 
appearance that these documents have become DOD’s primary instruments for VISA 
contracting, MARAD did not understand how its execution of the revised draft VEC, 
which essentially only identified and committed VISA participant capacity, would 
infringe on DOD authority. 
 
14 Sep 98 Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement Report on Price, Risk and Trade 
Analysis, chartered by USTRANSCOM’s Deputy Commander in Chief, completed by a 
DOD analysis team (consisting of personnel from USTRANSCOM (TCJ4/TCJ5), 
MTMC/MTMB, Stanley Associates, and CRC).  The goal of the DOD analysis team was 
to evaluate the carriers’ presentation on proposed incentives using factual data and 
historical documentation.  An Executive Summary, prepared by Rear Admiral Richard 
Naughton (Director, Plans and Policy, USTRANSCOM), concluded that the carrier 
proposed 400 percent incentive for VISA Stages I and II was not supportable, based on 
cargo volume and absent any model to predict market share recovery.  However, it 
appeared that an incentive of between 0 and 40 percent could be justified.  Furthermore, 
none of the analysis supported industry’s assertion of significant market losses. 
 
05 Oct 98 Air Force General Charles T. Robertson, Jr., USCINCTRANS, formally 
responded to Mr. Timothy Rhein’s, (President  and CEO, American President Lines, Ltd.) 
letter of 8 September inquiring as to whether or not the VISA Contingency Contract and 
the Universal Service Contract (USC2) received equal support and priority.  General 
Robertson confirmed that USTRANSCOM considered both the VCC and the USC2 
programs equally high in priority; however, he added, the command was firmly 
committed to completing the VCC before focusing efforts on the USC2 peacetime 
procurement (as agreed to at the April 1998 CEO meeting and the 17 September 1998 
EWG meeting). 
 
09 Oct 98 After an earlier analysis resulted in a USTRANSCOM decision to limit 
VISA Stage I and II incentives to not more than 30 percent, USTRANSCOM received a 
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copy of the Executive Summary of VISA Program:  An Analysis of Carrier Incentive 
Compensation (October 1998) prepared by A.T. Kearney, Inc.  The carriers had 
contracted with A.T. Kearney to provide an objective analysis of fair and reasonable 
incentive payments for Stages I and II of VISA activation.  Kearney’s risk-based model 
addressed the significant business and financial risks faced by the carriers to include 
service disruption; customer response and disruption of global customer relationships; 
range of potential military scenarios; and lost business opportunity.  The model was 
designed to identify the incentive rate that would make the carriers indifferent to joining 
Stages I and II (much as if they were to make an investment decision) and included a 
Monte Carlo simulation to examine the probability that specific sets of assumptions 
would occur.  The model determined that the average VISA contingency price premium 
would be 411 percent.  Kearney maintained that the DOD Revenue Analysis Model 
significantly understated business risk by focusing only on a single military scenario; 
confining service disruption to only the single route in question; failing to cover lost 
business opportunities, and assuming that customers will not perceive increasing risk of 
service disruption prior to the military emergency. 
 
16 Oct 98 MTMC issued the first draft of VISA Contingency Contract (VCC).  The 
carriers provided thirty pages of comments on the draft in November. 
 
16 Oct 98 Rate Methodology Working Group completed the final draft of the VISA 
Stage III Revenue based methodology for distribution to all VISA participants.  This 
commercial revenue-based compensation methodology established pre-determined rates 
for inclusion in the VISA Contingency Contract (VCC) which would implement the 
methodology; and these rates appled to US flag vessels enrolled in VISA Stage III.  
Furthermore, the methodology was intended to fully compensate the carrier at the rate it 
would have earned, but for the contingency. 
 
05 Nov 98 Point paper on VISA Stage I and II Incentive Rates, by Army Lieutenant 
Colonel Thomas Hillard (TCJ5-AS), recommended USTRANSCOM’s position that a 
maximum 40 percent incentive rate provided VISA carriers with sufficient revenues to 
offset the additional costs and business risks associated with supporting DOD during a 
contingency.  USTRANSCOM evaluated the A.T. Kearney model and its underlying 
assumptions, and replaced those assumptions with those that might be more reasonable 
(to include assumptions of longer contingencies, less time to recover lost market share, 
and less years of discount given to commercial customers for perceived risk). 
 
07 Nov 98 Second draft of VCC issued by MTMC prior to receiving comments from 
the carriers (see above entry). 
 
12 Nov 98 A VCC USTRANSCOM/MTMC and industry Working Group Meeting 
held to review carrier concerns highlighted in their initial comments to the first draft of 
the VCC. 
 
16 Nov 98 Staff Summary Sheet informed USTRANSCOM’s Deputy Commander in 
Chief that Sea-Land obtained an amendment to the Shipping Act of 1984 authorizing a 
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US flag vessel operator, in a vessel sharing agreement with a foreign flag operator, to 
prohibit the foreign flag operator from the carriage of preference cargo in US flag space.  
Essentially, this amendment allowed US flag carriers to close off potential competition 
for military cargoes from foreign flag lines that leased space on US subsidized vessels. 
 
04 Dec 98 Modified Voluntary Sealift Intermodal Sealift Rate Agreement (VISRA) 
filed with the Federal Maritime Commission (and published on 17 December as 63 FR 
69629).  In a point paper prepared by Air Force Brigadier General Gilbert Regan, Chief 
Counsel, USTRANSCOM, on 21 December for Deputy Commander in Chief, 
USTRANSCOM, to outline the potential pros and cons of the modified VISRA for DOD, 
expressed concern that VISRA language authorized carriers to discuss matters without 
the presence of government officials allowing carriers to:  collectively refuse to sign 
VEC/Contingency Contracts; function as an economic power block to unduly influence 
the terms of the contingency contract or peacetime contract; or engage in coordinated 
carrier action after a final RFP or IFB (even though VISRA attorneys maintained that 
VISRA was not intended to undermine the integrity of the procurement process). 
 
24 Dec 98 A Staff Summary Sheet prepared for USCINCTRANS by Navy Rear 
Admiral Richard Naughton provided a VISA Update to CEOs and NDTA.  RADM 
Naughton informed the CINC that the contracting process has been ongoing since mid-
October and a draft VCC had been reviewed by industry.  He also indicated that 
industry’s reaction to the draft VCC was in the form of a revisionist approach, reopening 
several previously agreed upon areas and submitting new areas of concern to industry.  
He stated there was renewed carrier interest in additional compensation areas because 
USTRANSCOM fixed the “additional profit” incentive at 40 percent in lieu of the 
industry desired 411 percent. 
 
08 Jan 99 In a letter to Air Force General Charles T. Robertson, Jr., 
USCINCTRANS, Maritime Administrator, Clyde Hart, noted that the Rate Methodology 
was in its final form, that it was created as the foundation upon which to build VISA 
carrier compensation, and that in concept it met the requirements of Section 653 of the 
Merchant Marine Act of 1936.  He also noted that MTMC recently issued the VISA 
Contingency Contract (VCC).  However, he expressed his alarm over the fact that the 
VCC might take precedence over the Rate Methodology; and he believed that without a 
strong, definitive commitment in the VCC and other documents that the Rate 
methodology was paramount, the Maritime Administration’s statutory responsibilities 
would not be satisfied. 
 
08 Jan 99 In a letter to the Secretary of the Federal Maritime Commission, MTMC’s 
Office of the Staff Judge Advocate filed its final comments concerning the Voluntary 
Intermodal Sealift Discussion Agreement, previously known as the Voluntary Intermodal 
Sealift Rate Agreement.  Legal representatives of MTMC and TRANSCOM had 
substantial discussions and negotiations with legal representatives of the Agreement and 
agreed upon language that was acceptable to all parties with regard to maintaining the 
integrity of the competitive procurement process and the program goals of VISA. 
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11 Jan 99 In a letter to Air Force General Charles T. Robertson, Jr., 
USCINCTRANS, Mr. Frank Halliwell, President and CEO of Lykes Lines Limited, 
expressed his concern that the most recent draft of the VCC (dated 23 December) 
continued to contain provisions that represented “unacceptable commercial risks to Lykes 
and insupportable service assumptions that cannot physically be realized by ocean 
carriers in the event of a contingency.”  He stated that he could not commit his company 
“to a contingency contract that threatens our commercial viability and gives credence to 
an emergency preparedness program that looks good on paper (at least to the military), 
but that cannot deliver the long-term contingency sealift capability that the military 
needs.” 
 
15-20 Jan 99 After USCINCTRANS tasked MTMC to clarify language on key issues 
associated with the final review of the VCC, MTMC made major progress working the 
issues and then briefed the VCC Review Group on 21 January.  
 
21-22 Jan 99 Established to conduct a final interview of the VCC, the VCC Review 
Group consisted of Army Lieutenant General Roger G. Thompson, Jr., Deputy 
Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, as Chairman and representatives from the 
government and industry.  The group met to identify and fix critical issues, reduce 
ambiguities, and identify items that might need to be deferred to VCC2.  It also reviewed 
over 70 issues identified as “major” by the carriers and resolved 62 of them.  Several 
issues were identified that needed to be worked in the future within the JPAG process. 
 
29 Jan 99 In a letter to Air Force General Charles T. Robertson, Jr., 
USCINCTRANS, Maritime Administrator, Clyde Hart, formally approved the VISA 
Revenue Based Methodology (RBM).  He stated that it was his understanding that the 
VISA Enrollment Contract would specify that for carriers choosing Rate Methodology A, 
the RBM would be the governing document for determining VISA compensation; and 
that he was satisfied that the compensation elements relative to the RBM required by 
Section 653 of the MSA were being met.  It was also his understanding that the RBM 
would be incorporated into the VCC. 
 
05 Feb 99 In a Memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, 
Development & Acquisition), the Commander, Military Sealift Command, formally 
requested approval of Class Justification and Approval (J&A) for other than full and open 
competition with regard to Drytime Contingency Contracts (DCC) executed between the 
Government and VISA participants with respect to each vessel committed to VISA.  The 
DCCs would serve as the implementing contract for VISA and be used to time charter 
entire ships.  The rate for inclusion in the DCCs for the contingency charter of the ships 
would be determined by one of three rate methodologies that were being developed:  A, 
revenue based formula; B, peacetime rate formula; or C negotiated rates).  Each VISA 
Participant would be required to submit a rate proposal using one of the three 
methodologies. 
 
05 Feb 99 In a Memorandum for Headquarters, MTMC (MTAQ), the Hon. Kenneth 
Oscar, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement), returned, with no action, 
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the proposed Class Justification and Approval (J&A) for other than full and open 
competition relating to the VISA Contingency Contracts (VCC) program.  He stated that 
his office and the Office of General Counsel concluded that the VISA program provided 
for full and open competition. 
 
03 Mar 99 In a Memorandum to all VISA Participants, Army Lieutenant General 
Roger G. Thompson, Jr. Deputy Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, announced a 
revised timeline that would shift the effective date of VCC02/DCC02 from October 1999 
to October 2000.  He stated that the VISA Executive Working Group (EWG) at its 18 
February meeting recommended the timeline revision to allow a more dedicated effort to 
be applied to developing the peacetime USC02 best value contract, and avoid industry 
and government working simultaneously on peacetime and contingency contracting 
during the summer of 1999.  
 
01 Apr 99 In a letter to Army Lieutenant General Roger G. Thompson, Jr., Deputy 
Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, John Graykowski, Deputy Maritime 
Administrator, expressed several reservations concerning proposed changes to the DOD 
cargo preference program that would enable DOD voyage chartered, time chartered, or 
Defense Transportation Systems (DTS) contracted US flag vessels of VISA participants 
to carry preference cargo of civilian agencies at less than fully distributed costs.  While 
he understood that it was USTRANSCOM’s legal position that DOD voyage or time 
chartered commercial vessels and DTS vessels were not military or government ships, 
Graykowski argued that since DOD would control the entire capacity of the voyage and 
time chartered vessels, which were contracted for military purposes, these vessels should 
be considered as military vessels and covered by OMB Circular A-76 (which generally 
prohibited federal government competition with its private citizens in commercial 
activities). 
 
14 Jun 99 In a Memorandum for Counsel, Military Sealift Command, Brigadier 
General Gilbert Regan (Chief Counsel, USTRANSCOM) asserts that USTRANSCOM 
has been delegated authority from the Secretary of Defense to approve rates under the 
Maritime Security Act (MSA) for purposes of the VISA Stage III rates offered by 
subsidized U.S. Flag carriers. 
 
20 Aug 99 In a Memorandum to DOD’s General Counsel, USTRANSCOM’s Chief 
Counsel, Air Force Brigadier General Gilbert Regan, requested a definitive opinion as to 
whether or not the letter of 12 December 1996 from the Secretary of Defense delegated 
MSA rate approval authority to CINCTRANS.  
 
16 Sep 99 In a letter to Ms. Judith Miller, DOD General Counsel, Air Force 
Brigadier General Gilbert Regan, Chief Counsel, USTRANSCOM, requested Ms. Miller 
to personally review and resolve USTRANSCOM’s position on the issue concerning the 
“delegation of SECDEF’s authority under the Maritime Security Act to approve 
compensation for contingency sealift.”  General Regan stated that he was concerned 
about any suggested approach that might require CINCTRANSCOM to go back to the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense to clarify the scope of the previous delegation. 
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10 Dec 99 In a Memorandum to Air Force General Charles T. Robertson, Jr., 
USCINCTRANS, Army Major General Privratsky, Commander, MTMC, requested 
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